A No-Excuse Approach to Transitional Justice: Reparations As Tools of Extraordinary Justice by Gray, David C.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 87 Issue 5 
2010 
A No-Excuse Approach to Transitional Justice: Reparations As 
Tools of Extraordinary Justice 
David C. Gray 
University of Maryland 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, Legal History Commons, Military, War, and Peace 
Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David C. Gray, A No-Excuse Approach to Transitional Justice: Reparations As Tools of Extraordinary 
Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1043 (2010). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1043 
A NO-EXCUSE APPROACH TO TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE: REPARATIONS AS TOOLS OF 
EXTRAORDINARY JUSTICE 
DAVID C. GRAY∗
ABSTRACT 
 
It is sometimes the case that a debate goes off the rails so early that 
riders assume the rough country around them is the natural backdrop for 
their travels. That is certainly true in the debate over reparations in 
transitions to democracy. Reparations traditionally are understood as 
material or symbolic awards to victims of an abusive regime granted 
outside of a legal process. While some reparations claims succeed—such 
as those made by Americans of Japanese descent interned during World 
War II and those made by European Jews against Germany after World 
War II—most do not. The principal culprits in these failures are objections 
that reflect commitments to “ethical individualism.”  
By way of response, some advocates attempt to put reparations back on 
course by appealing to theories of collective responsibility. Where put 
strongly, these theories suffer from basic conceptual deficits. Weaker 
versions, such as theories based on moral taint and related efforts that 
seek atonement or reconciliation, turn on moral sentiments, such as 
regret, and therefore cannot give rise to objective and externally 
enforceable duties of repair. More creative solutions, such as approaches 
pursuing “restorative justice,” have some intuitive appeal but want for 
theoretical clarity and therefore fail to provide persuasive practical 
guidance.  
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This Article proposes a new approach. Rather than conceiving of 
reparations as solely retrospective, which implicates knotty issues of 
responsibility, or solely prospective, which raises problems of 
enforceability and political practicality, this Article argues that 
reparations are Janus-faced. In keeping with a larger project arguing that 
transitional justice is not just a special case of ordinary justice, this 
Article suggests treating transitions as liminal moments and contends that 
reparations ought to reflect the extraordinary conditions implied by this 
temporal status “betwixt and between”1
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 an abusive past and a future 
committed to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 1045 
II. A FOUR-DIMENSIONAL MODEL OF REPARATIONS ........................... 1051 
A. A Four-Dimensional Model of Reparations .......................... 1054 
B. Major Objections to Reparations .......................................... 1058 
1. Material Reparations..................................................... 1058 
2. Nonmaterial Reparations .............................................. 1060 
3. Individual Reparations .................................................. 1061 
4. Group Reparations ........................................................ 1062 
5. State Sponsored Reparations ......................................... 1064 
6. Group Sponsored Reparations ...................................... 1066 
7. Individually Funded Reparations .................................. 1066 
8. Reparations Funded by Perpetrators ............................ 1067 
9. Reparations Funded by Those Associated with 
Atrocities ....................................................................... 1067 
10.  Reparations Paid by those Not Implicated in Past 
Abuses ............................................................................ 1068 
11.  Persistent Themes ......................................................... 1068 
III. POTENTIAL RESPONSES ................................................................... 1070 
A. Collective Responsibility ....................................................... 1071 
B. Atonement .............................................................................. 1079 
C. Transformative Justice .......................................................... 1085 
D. Rapid Social Change ............................................................. 1087 
IV. A LIMINAL ROLE FOR REPARATIONS IN TRANSITIONS TO 
DEMOCRACY ................................................................................. 1093 
 
 
 1. VICTOR TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS: ASPECTS OF NDEMBU RITUAL 93 (1967) [hereinafter 
TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010] A NO-EXCUSE APPROACH TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1045 
 
 
 
 
A. Radical Evil and Extraordinary Justice ................................ 1095 
B. Repairing Paradigms of Abuse.............................................. 1099 
V. CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 1103 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“It wasn’t me!”2 There is, perhaps, no defense claim more 
fundamental. It reflects the basic proposition that we can only be held to 
account for what we do and the harm we cause. This intuition is 
ubiquitous in normative fields of law and moral philosophy, where oceans 
of ink have been spilled3 teasing out the nuances and applications of a 
proposition that all three-year-olds understand: we do not punish people 
for crimes they did not commit.4
Perhaps because the claim that innocence matters is so ubiquitous, or 
perhaps because it is just True, there is no better way to poke the limbic 
bear of moral outrage than to hold one person responsible for conduct not 
his own or to order him to compensate for harms he has not caused. 
Thence the most basic challenges to theories of vicarious and strict 
liability—which usually respond by identifying a voluntary act or 
informed decision that may serve to anchor liability—arise and, thus, our 
ready willingness to let ten guilty men go free rather than embrace 
procedures that risk convicting one innocent man.
 With few exceptions, we do not hold 
people liable for harms they did not cause. We do not bind people to 
agreements to which they have not bound themselves.  
5
This quaint little commitment to punish only the guilty and to hold 
liable only those responsible is also at the heart of contests over 
 
 
 
 2. SHAGGY, It Wasn’t Me, on HOT SHOT (MCA Records 2000); see also David Gray, It Wasn’t 
Me, CONCURRING OPINIONS, Jan. 5, 2009, http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/01/it_ 
wasnt_me.html (discussing Paul Bloom, First Person Plural, ATLANTIC, Nov. 2008, at 90). 
 3. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. III, chs. 1–5 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett 
Publishing Co., Inc. 2000); A.J. AYER, Freedom and Necessity, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 271 
(1954); H.L.A. HART, Acts of Will and Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 90 
(1968); Gideon Rosen, Skepticism About Moral Responsibility, 18 PHIL. PERSP. 295 (2004); Peter 
Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 1 (1962); B.A.O. Williams & T. Nagel, 
Moral Luck, 50 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 115, 137 (1976). 
 4. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 246 (1952) (emphasizing standards of liability 
and the central role of presumption of innocence in American jurisprudence). 
 5. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358; see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[F]or my part I think it a less[er] evil that some 
criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part.”); Alexander Volokh, N 
Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174–77 (1997). 
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reparations.6 The protest is particularly pronounced in domestic debates 
about reparations for slavery.7 Contemporary whites asked to contribute 
directly or through taxes protest that they have never owned slaves8 and 
were born generations after the practice was abolished.9 Some even point 
out, with varying degrees of accuracy, that nobody in their family has ever 
owned slaves.10 If they have no direct, or at least personal, connection to 
the abuses, it seems beyond contest that they should not be held 
responsible for paying compensation11—an objection only amplified by 
the fact that the proposed beneficiaries were never themselves slaves.12
 
 
 6. See, e.g., When Sorry Isn’t Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for 
Human Injustice 3, 8 (Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999) [hereinafter Brooks, When Sorry Isn’t Enough]; 
Lawrie Balfour, Reparations After Identity Politics, 33 POL. THEORY 786, 794 (2005); Roy L. Brooks, 
Getting Reparations for Slavery Right—A Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
251 (2004) [hereinafter Brooks, Reparations]; Thomas McCarthy, Coming to Terms with Our Past, 
Part II: On the Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery, 32 POL. THEORY 750, 752–53 (2004); 
Eric J. Miller, Reconceiving Reparations: Multiple Strategies in the Reparations Debate, 24 B.C. 
THIRD WORLD L.J. 45, 49–52 (2004); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Current Reparations Debate, 36 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2003); Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives 
Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1765–68 (2005); Eric A. Posner & Adrian 
Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 691, 
698–704 (2003) [hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Reparations]; Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsibility for 
Historical Injustices: Reconceiving the Case for Reparations, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 183, 185–86 (2006).  
 
These same concerns were cited in the record of a recent Senate 
 7. See JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIST AMERICA: ROOTS, CURRENT REALITIES, AND FUTURE 
REPARATIONS (2000); SHOULD AMERICA PAY? SLAVERY AND THE RAGING DEBATE ON REPARATIONS 
(Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003) [hereinafter SHOULD AMERICA PAY?]; Brooks, Reparations, supra 
note 6; Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6; Sepinwall, supra note 6; Robert W. Tracinski, 
America’s “Field of the Blackbirds”: How the Campaign for Reparations for Slavery Perpetuates 
Racism, 3 J.L. SOC’Y 145 (2002); Watson Branch, Comment, Reparations for Slavery: A Dream 
Deferred, 3 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 177 (2002); cf. RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE 
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (Eric K. Yamamoto et al. eds., 2001). 
 8. See Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 184 n.10 (quoting Rep. Henry Hyde claiming that “I never 
owned a slave. I never oppressed anybody. I don’t know that I should have to pay for someone who 
did [own slaves] generations before I was born.”) (alteration in original). 
 9. See Antonin Scalia, The Disease as Cure: “In Order to Get Beyond Racism, We Must First 
Take Account of Race”, in 2 AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT 
“SOLVES” THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ISSUE 83, 88 (Gabriel J. Chin ed., 1998); Tracinski, supra note 7, 
at 151; see also Bob Gibson, Slavery Apology Measure Ignites Legislative Debate, CHARLOTTESVILLE 
DAILY PROGRESS, Jan. 16, 2007, available at http://www.dailyprogress.com/cdp/news/local/local_ 
govtpolitics/article/slavery_apology_measure_ignites_legislative_debate1/13699/ (quoting Del. Frank 
D. Hargrove in opposition to a proposed resolution apologizing for slavery saying, “The present 
commonwealth has nothing to do with slavery.”). 
 10. Balfour, supra note 6, at 794. For example, Sen. John McCain famously denied that his 
family owned slaves when, in fact, they did. See Douglas A. Blackmon, Two Families Named McCain, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2008, at A1.   
 11. See Roy L. Brooks, Toward a Perpetrator-Focused Model of Slave Redress, 6 AFR.-AM. L. 
& POL’Y REP. 49, 61 (2004) [hereinafter Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused]; Gregory Kane, Why the 
Reparations Movement Should Fail, 3 MARGINS 189, 197 (2003). 
 12. Miller, supra note 6, at 52; Tracinski, supra note 7, at 151. 
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Resolution apologizing for slavery and Jim Crow laws, which declined to 
endorse claims for reparation.13 While cast historically, these objections 
are nothing more than the familiar “I didn’t do it. It wasn’t me.”14
Similar objections play a common and powerful role in transitional 
justice debates.
 
15 Transitional justice asks what a successor regime 
committed to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law can and should 
do to achieve justice for human rights abuses perpetrated by and under an 
abusive forebear.16 “Transitional justice is a field on an upward 
trajectory”17 that recently has emerged as an interdiscipline in its own 
right,18 but the animating question dates back at least to 405 BC after the 
fall of the twelve tyrants.19 Contemporary interest in transitional justice 
reflects the encouraging decline over the last twenty years or so of 
autocratic states committed to institutionalized human rights violations as 
part of the “Third Wave” of democratization.20 In the wake of this 
tsunami, a number of states have proposed reparations as at least a partial 
response to past wrongs.21
While the atrocities addressed in transitional justice debates are of 
more recent vintage than the United States’ history of slavery, the 
 
 
 
 13. S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009) (officially recognizing and apologizing for the wrongs 
and persisting consequences of slavery and Jim Crow laws but disclaiming, “Nothing in this resolution 
. . . authorizes or supports any claim against the United States . . . .”). 
 14. See Tracinski, supra note 7, at 146; see also Miller, supra note 6, at 53–54 (recounting two 
comedy gambits, one by Chris Rock and the other by Wanda Sykes, in which these black comedians 
approached whites on the streets to request reparations payments and were met variously with disbelief 
and outrage). 
 15. See, e.g., KARL JASPERS, THE QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT 41–43 (1948) (noting that 
claims of innocence were common in post-World War II Germany). 
 16. David Gray, An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2621, 2621–23 (2006) [hereinafter Gray, Excuse-Centered].  
 17. Kieran McEvoy, Letting Go of Legalism: Developing a ‘Thicker’ Version of Transitional 
Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW 15 (Kieran McEvoy & Lorna McGregor eds., 2008). 
 18. Contemporary conversations about transitional justice began with a debate in print between 
Professors Diane Orentlicher and Carlos Nino published in the Yale Law Journal. See Carlos S. Nino, 
The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put into Context: The Case of Argentina, 100 YALE 
L.J. 2619 (1991); Diane F. Orentlicher, A Reply to Professor Nino, 100 YALE L.J. 2641 (1991); Diane 
F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 
100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991). 
 19. JON ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS 3–23 (2004); PLATO, APOLOGY 32b–e (G.M.A. Grube 
trans., 1981). 
 20. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991). 
 21. For example, reparations have been part of transitional justice efforts in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, El Salvador, Germany, Japan, Malawi, South Africa, and the United States in response to the 
internment of persons of Japanese descent during World War II, among others. See PRISCILLA 
HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS 7 (2002); THE 
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS (Pablo De Greiff ed., 2008).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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objections are familiar.22 Many asked to pay disclaim the past regime and 
contend that they did not personally commit human rights abuses.23 Those 
directly connected to atrocities argue that they relied on existing law, 
which told them that targeted abuses against a particular group were right, 
necessary, or at least not illegal.24
Reparations advocates share the foundational belief that only the guilty 
should be punished and only those responsible can be held liable. 
Unfortunately, this commitment seems to impose an insurmountable 
barrier against collective funding of reparations, which is the only realistic 
way to provide the necessary finances. The halfhearted solution has been 
to sketch theories of associational responsibility, derivative collective 
responsibility, or moral taint.
 While those in this latter group cannot 
claim that they did not do it, they can displace responsibility to the state or 
protest that imposing liability would violate prohibitions against ex post 
facto enforcement of law. Whether packaged as “I didn’t do it” or “I didn’t 
do anything wrong,” the core objection is the same. 
25 These attempts seldom persuade, and for 
good reason. They run full-force into the individualism fundamental to our 
common intuitions of blame and responsibility.26 Other reparations 
supporters have sought to change the debate by appealing to theories of 
“restorative justice” that eschew entanglement with the past in favor of a 
future-oriented focus on reconciliation27 or redemption.28 These novel 
efforts raise their own conceptual concerns.29
 
 
 22. See generally ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING 
HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (2000); HAYNER, supra note 
 Perhaps worse, they fail to 
21; MICHAEL HENDERSON, FORGIVENESS: 
BREAKING THE CHAIN OF HATE (2d rev. ed. 2003); HUMAN RIGHTS IN DEVELOPMENT: YEARBOOK 
2001 (George Ulrich & Louise Krabbe Boserup eds., 2003); POLITICS AND THE PAST: ON REPAIRING 
HISTORICAL INJUSTICES (John Torpey ed., 2003); THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 21.  
 23. Ogletree, supra note 6, at 1052.  
 24. Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative 
Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683, 711 (2004); Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 
2631–36; Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 691. This is precisely the question with which the 
German Constitutional Court struggled in the “Border Guard Cases.” See 3 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
576 (Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995) (English translation of proceeding in Berlin State Court, No. (523) 2 Js 
48/90 (9/91)). 
 25. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY: ETHICS AND LAW FOR A COLLECTIVE AGE 113–
45 (2000); LARRY MAY, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY 151 (1992); Anthony Appiah, Racism and Moral 
Pollution, 18 PHIL. FORUM 185 (1987); Marina A. L. Oshana, Moral Taint, in GENOCIDE’S 
AFTERMATH: RESPONSIBILITY AND REPAIR 71 (Claudia Card & Armen T. Marsoobian eds., 2007). For 
an extended explanation and critique of these concepts, see infra Part III. 
 26. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (“Crime, as a compound concept, 
generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind and an evil-doing hand, was 
congenial to an intense individualism and took deep and early root in American soil.”). 
 27. See infra Part III.C. 
 28. Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 255. 
 29. See infra Parts III.B and III.C. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/3
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lay any foundation for claims that reparations are imperative and also fail 
to provide a robust normative justification for any particular form of 
reparation.  
More troubling than these theoretical worries are concerns that 
reparations do not work. This is the most significant and least addressed 
objection to reparations. Even where reparations are paid, the money itself 
is insufficient to the task of reparation.30 Moreover, recipients frequently 
remain in a persistent condition of material and social inequality. “Forty 
acres and a mule,” the reparation promised by General Sherman to former 
American slaves31 and codified by Section Four of the Freedmen’s Bureau 
Act,32 was not even paid,33 and lesser grants of land, goods, and money 
certainly did not leave former slaves in a condition of justice.34 Many now 
trace the absence and inadequacy of those reparations efforts to 
contemporary achievement gaps between black and white Americans.35 
Native American groups have, for the most part, fared no better despite 
large land grants, mineral rights, and sovereign exemptions from state 
regulations.36 Reparations paid in South Africa37
 
 
 30. Pablo De Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 
 have done almost nothing 
21, at 451, 465–66. 
 31. See William T. Sherman, Special Field Order No. 15 (Jan. 16, 1865), reprinted in THE 
FORTY ACRES DOCUMENTS: WHAT DID THE UNITED STATES REALLY PROMISE THE PEOPLE FREED 
FROM SLAVERY? 51 (House of Songhay Commission for Positive Education, 1994); Kane, supra note 
11, at 194. 
 32. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (lapsed 1869), quoted in Berry v. United States, 
No. C-94-0796-DLJ, 1994 WL 374537, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 1994). The Act expired in 1869. 
Berry, 1994 WL374537, at *1.   
 33. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 52; Kane, supra note 11, at 195. 
 34. See Berry, 1994 WL 374537, at *1 (plaintiff seeking forty acres of land in San Francisco or 
$3 million as compensation for slavery). 
 35. S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009) (“African-Americans continue to suffer from the 
consequences of slavery and Jim Crow laws—long after both systems were formally abolished—
through enormous damage and loss, both tangible and intangible, including the loss of human dignity 
and liberty. . . .”); cf. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 697–707; Miller, supra note 6, at 49; Naomi 
Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 157, 173–
74 (2004). 
 36. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 53. This is not true of all Native American 
groups. Leveraging their sovereignty, a number of tribes have established successful gaming 
businesses, sometimes for group benefit and sometimes enriching a select few. See Edward D. Gehres 
III, Visions of the Ghost Dance: Native American Empowerment and the Neo-Colonial Impulse, 17 
J.L. & POL. 135, 141–45 (2001); Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Playing the Political Slots, 
TIME, Dec. 23, 2002, at 52; Donald L. Bartlett & James B. Steele, Wheel of Misfortune, TIME, Dec. 16, 
2002, at 44. However, credit for those successes cannot credibly be traced to minimal reparations. See 
generally Gehres, supra, at 144–45.  
 37. See Regulations Regarding Reparation to Victims R1660/2003, reprinted in THE HANDBOOK 
OF REPARATIONS, supra note 21, at 816; Reparation and Rehabilitation Policy, in 5 TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, vol. 5, ch. 5 (1998), reprinted in THE 
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 21, at 791; Warren Freedman, The Restitution of Land 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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to improve the lot of black South Africans and arguably have left them in 
a worse condition, occasioning deep ambivalence with the entire 
transitional justice process.38 Some victims of institutionalized human 
rights abuses have made gains, but seldom if ever due to reparations. For 
example, contemporary Japanese Americans bear the marks of 
internment,39 but, measured by demographic achievement, have made 
significant economic and social gains in the interim. However, those gains 
cannot credibly be explained by reparations, which were not paid until 
198840 and, at any rate, were minimal and regarded as symbolic by most 
recipients.41 Even where the amount of reparation paid is more significant, 
such as in Argentina, political realities and abiding guilt among survivors 
concerned with spending “cursed money” limit the capacity of reparations 
to significantly change the lot of victims or recipients.42 The simple fact 
that reparations programs largely fail to achieve any demonstrative gain 
for victims has largely been ignored in practice and the literature.43
This Article proposes a new path. It contends that normative objections 
to and the practical failures of reparations derive from some combination 
of two conceptual mistakes. The first is to treat transitional justice 
generally as a special case of ordinary justice, and reparations in particular 
as a species of tort claim. The second is to engage in a temporal bias, 
viewing reparations as either solely retrospective or entirely prospective. 
In keeping with prior work contending that transitional justice is 
extraordinary justice,
  
44
 
 
Rights in South Africa as Reparation for Past Injustices, 22 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 157 
(2003).  
 this Article argues that “I didn’t do it” is a non 
 38. Christopher J. Colvin, Overview of the Reparations Program in South Africa, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 21, at 176, 189–90, 200. 
 39. LESLIE T. HATAMIYA, RIGHT A WRONG: JAPANESE AMERICANS IN THE PASSAGE OF THE 
CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT OF 1988, 130–36 (1993). 
 40. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. § 1989b (2000); Civil Liberties Act Amendments 
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-371, 106 Stat. 1167. 
 41. See Eric K. Yamamoto & Liann Ebesugawa, Report on Redness: The Japanese American 
Internment, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 21, at 257, 276. 
 42. See María José Guembe, Economic Reparations for Grave Human Rights Violations: The 
Argentinean Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 21, at 21, 46–47. 
 43. This is not to denigrate reparations entirely. Quite to the contrary, as is argued here, 
reparations have an important role to play in a broader transitional justice program. Neither is it to 
suggest that past reparations programs are entirely without merit or success. Rather, the point is that 
because those programs have largely been limited in their scope, imagination, and attachment to a 
broader program of transitional justice, those programs have at best achieved modest compensation for 
material loss without addressing the underlying sources of those harms as consequences of targeted 
violence. See infra Part IV. 
 44. See generally David C. Gray, Devilry, Complicity, and Greed: Transitional Justice and 
Odious Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (2007) [hereinafter Gray, Devilry]; Gray, Excuse-
Centered, supra note 16. 
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sequitur in debates about reparations where the fundamental question is 
“How do we make it right?”.  
Part II provides an overview of the reparations debate. “Reparations” 
encompasses a variety of potential responses to mass atrocities. This 
section attempts to bring some order to the debate by charting the potential 
forms reparations may take alongside their corresponding objections. Part 
II then describes how these objections depend on one or both of the cited 
conceptual mistakes: (1) treating reparations as tort claims, or (2) 
assuming that reparations either are entirely retrospective or entirely 
prospective. Part III reviews some of the most common justifications for 
and defenses of reparations and points out how they too fall victim to one 
or both of these cognitive mistakes and therefore fail to meet some or all 
of the most compelling objections to reparations proposals. Part IV sets 
the stage for a novel approach to reparations that takes seriously the 
unique characteristics of transitions and transitional justice. In particular, it 
argues that transitional justice is Janus-faced and that reparations are 
liminal tools for addressing the social conditions that lie beneath 
pretransitional abuses.  
II. A FOUR-DIMENSIONAL MODEL OF REPARATIONS 
All transitions are characterized by a disparity between needs and 
resources. In addition to justice, new governments must ensure the peace, 
achieve stability, reform public institutions, repair infrastructure, shift 
social norms, and institutionalize commitments to human rights and the 
rule of law.45
After the impulse to seek revenge, or perhaps as a consequence of it, 
the most common instinct in the face of mass violence is to prosecute 
everyone responsible.
 These demands are extraordinary, and even with aid from 
friendly states and international institutions, all transitions must make 
difficult decisions. Some of the most troubling decisions are presented by 
justice initiatives.  
46 Unfortunately, this is almost always impossible.47
 
 
 45. HAYNER, supra note 
 
The abusive regimes that give way to transition are characterized by large-
scale abuses that involve the participation and complicity of tens, and 
often hundreds, of thousands of individuals, agencies, and corporations. 
21, at 11. 
 46. See ALEX BORAINE, A LIFE IN TRANSITION 203 (2008); HAYNER, supra note 21, at 12; Lisa 
J. Laplante & Kimberly Theidon, Truth with Consequences: Justice and Reparations in Post-Truth 
Commission Peru, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 228, 242–43 (2007). 
 47. Laplante & Theidon, supra note 46, at 243. 
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The resources—material, human, institutional, and political—needed to 
prosecute everyone implicated in pretransitional violence far exceed those 
available to transitional regimes, a shortfall only made worse by the fact 
that justice programs must compete with other high-priority goals, 
including stability and security.48
This disparity between needs and resources confronts transitional 
regimes with a “justice gap.”
  
49 Much of the practice of and academic 
debate over transitional justice is caught up in attempts to span this gap, 
usually by resort to hybrid programs featuring truth commissions, 
reparations, formal or de facto amnesties, lustration, and limited criminal 
trials focusing on those most responsible for past violence.50 However, 
these efforts often are ad hoc and under theorized, leaving transitional 
regimes and their constituents with the sense that they are settling for the 
best justice possible given “very imperfect” circumstances51
The most common gap-filling measures deployed by transitional 
regimes are truth commissions and reparations.
—one more 
jab in the ribs of a people who have already borne extraordinary hardship.  
52 Truth commissions offer 
a procedure for examining and detailing past violence and attempt to fill 
the forensic vacuum left in the wake of decisions not to prosecute by 
providing an opportunity for victims, perpetrators, and witnesses to say 
what happened in a forum imbued with official status.53 Reparations, 
whether paid directly by wrongdoers or in their stead by the transitional 
regime, attempt to fill accountability and compensation gaps by providing 
recognition and partial redemption for victims while imposing on abusers 
direct or derivative liability.54 Some form of reparation has been a part of 
almost every hybrid program of transitional justice.55
 
 
 48. I am in debt to now-Representative Tom Perriello (D-Va.) for making the point that 
transitional justice and security are not always at odds and for sharing his views on the role of justice 
initiatives in achieving both short- and long-term stability.  
 “Forty Acres” were 
 49. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2624–29.  
 50. Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 355 (2002). 
 51. Pablo De Greiff, International Courts and Transitions to Democracy, 12 PUB. AFF. Q. 79, 79 
(1998); see also Michel Rosenfeld, Restitution, Retribution, Political Justice and the Rule of Law, 2 
CONSTELLATIONS 309, 310 (1996); Paul van Zyl, Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case of South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 52 J. INT’L AFF. 647, 648 (1999). 
 52. HAYNER, supra note 21, at 170–73. 
 53. Id. at 14–23. 
 54. Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery and the Tort Law Analogy, 24 
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81, 124–32 (2004); De Greiff, supra note 30, at 460–61; Laplante & Theidon, 
supra note 46, at 245; Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6; Ruth Rubio-Marín & Pablo De 
Greiff, Women and Reparations, 1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 318, 318–21 (2007). 
 55. See supra note 21; Balfour, supra note 6, at 787; Rubio-Marín & De Greiff, supra note 54, at 
318. See generally Roht-Arriaza, supra note 35. 
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offered to former slaves during Reconstruction as partial reparation for 
their period of servitude, though the benefit was never paid.56 Germany 
paid reparations both to individual victims of the Holocaust and to the 
state of Israel.57 Japan offered monetary compensation to Korean “comfort 
women,” despite denying the fact of the abuse, much less Japan’s 
responsibility.58 Reparations in various forms have been paid in South 
Africa to victims of Apartheid.59 Pursuant to legislative action, the United 
States paid reparations to Japanese Americans and others confined to 
internment camps during World War II.60 Native Americans have also 
received a string of purportedly reparatory payments and compensation 
from the government of the United States.61 More recently, some have 
proposed truth and reconciliation committees in combination with 
reparations, as partial justice for slavery,62 Jim Crow laws,63 and for the 
legacy of lynching.64
Each of these efforts has met with varying degrees of opposition. In 
some cases, this opposition has simply limited the extent of the reparative 
effort. In others, it has required that all payments be accompanied by a 
denial of responsibility.
 
65
 
 
 56. See supra notes 
 In the case of contemporary claims for slavery 
31–33 and accompanying text. In 2009, the Senate passed a resolution 
formally apologizing for slavery, but specifically declined to recognize any right to reparation. S. Con. 
Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009). Whether the United States is a transitional regime, still coming to terms 
with slavery and institutional racism, or posttransitional, is highly contested. While this Article does 
not take a firm stand in the debate, the theory proposed here suggests that the United States would 
benefit from addressing issues of racial inequality using insights and tools from the theory and practice 
of transitional justice.  
 57. Ariel Colonomos & Andrea Armstrong, German Reparations to the Jews After World War 
II: A Turning Point in the History of Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 21, 
at 390; FOREIGN CLAIMS SETTLEMENT COMM’N, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, GERMAN COMPENSATION 
FOR NATIONAL SOCIALIST CRIMES (1996), reprinted in BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra 
note 6, at 61–67. 
 58. George Hicks, The Comfort Women Redress Movement, in BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T 
ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 113, 124. 
 59. Colvin, supra note 38, at 176–214. 
 60. See Civil Liberties Act of 1998, 50 U.S.C. § 1989b (2000); BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T 
ENOUGH, supra note 6, pt. 4; Yamamoto & Ebesugawa, supra note 41, at 257.  
 61. BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 266–67. 
 62. See, e.g., BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973) (advocating 
reparations for slavery); Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 273–74 (noting important role for truth-
seeking procedures as part of larger project of slavery reparations); John Conyers Jr. with Jo Ann 
Nichols Watson, Reparations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY?, supra note 
7, at 14 (advocating reparations for slavery).  
 63. BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 395–400. 
 64. See SHERRILYN IFILL, ON THE COURTHOUSE LAWN: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF 
LYNCHING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 150–53 (2007). 
 65. See supra note 56; see also Guembe, supra note 42, at 46 (describing how concerns for 
opposition driven by denials of responsibility limited public discussion of reparations efforts in 
Argentina). 
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reparations in the United States, opposition has frozen claims in their 
political and legal tracks. Much of that debate and its consequences is both 
deeply confused and deeply confusing. That is due in no small part to 
imprecision. Therefore, the next section proposes a more refined model of 
reparations on the way to a directed account of the main arguments in 
opposition. 
A. A Four-Dimensional Model of Reparations 
As we will see in the next section, reparations66 present a number of 
challenges, both theoretical and concrete.67 While much of the literature is 
abstract,68 there is a justifiable plea for a more structured debate attached 
to specific proposals.69 It seems intuitive, after all, that the nature of 
challenges to reparations will depend on the form of the proposed 
program, its intended beneficiaries, and the identity of those expected to 
contribute.70
Broadly, the benefits distributed by reparation programs can be 
categorized as either material or nonmaterial.
 Any topography of the debate landscape must then start with 
typology of its inhabitants. That is the task in this section.  
71 That is, reparations can 
take the form of concrete benefits, such as cash payments,72 social welfare 
entitlements, or guaranteed access to education and employment.73
 
 
 66. I am conscious of the fact that the extension of “reparation” is not a given in the literature. 
Roy Brooks, for example, would limit “reparation” to forms of redress accompanied by a fulsome and 
heartfelt apology. See Brooks, Reparations, supra note 
  
6, at 255–56. A more common definition is a 
form of material or symbolic compensation provided in the absence of legal obligation or outside legal 
process. See, e.g., De Greiff, supra note 30, at 452–53; Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and 
Reparations, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1657, 1660 n.8 (1999); Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 
6, at 691–94. This Article, reflecting realities of the academic and public debate, will use “reparation” 
more generally, achieving precision descriptively, rather than by contesting semantics. 
 67. See infra Part II.B. 
 68. See, e.g., Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 288 (calling for a “high-minded discussion of 
morality and justice” before thinking about “the forms of redress, in all their possible configurations”). 
 69. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 689–90. But see Brooks, 
Reparations, supra note 6, at 287 (asserting that examining concrete proposals in order to better 
understand the form, content, and application of potential objections is “so very wrong”). 
 70. Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting A Path To Reconciliation, 12 INT’L LEGAL 
PERSP. 73, 77–78 (2001); Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 689. 
 71. Roy L. Brooks, The Age of Apology, in BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 6, 
at 9 [hereinafter Brooks, The Age of Apology]; De Greiff, supra note 30, at 468–70; Posner & 
Vermeule, supra note 6, at 725–36; Roht-Arriaza, Reparations, supra note 35, at 159–60; Rubio-
Marín & De Greiff, supra note 54, at 330–32; Ernesto Verdeja, A Normative Theory of Reparations in 
Transitional Democracies, in GENOCIDE’S AFTERMATH: RESPONSIBILITY AND REPAIR 166, 171–78 
(Claudia Card & Armen T. Marsoobian eds., 2007).  
 72. See, e.g., 1994 Fla. Laws 3296–98 (providing cash payments to victims and heirs of the 
Rosewood Massacre); Eileen Finan, Delayed Justice: The Rosewood Story, 22 HUM. RTS. 8–9 (1995). 
 73. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. § 1989b (2000) (providing education funds for 
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Reparations can also be more ethereal, including apologies, memorials, 
and efforts to achieve social, cultural, and institutional reform.74 Beyond 
form, reparations also can be categorized according to who benefits and 
who contributes. For example, reparations can be directed either toward 
specific individuals or a group.75 Likewise, those asked to contribute may 
be selected individuals, groups, or states.76
Starting with the nature of the program and the proposed recipients, we 
can understand the possibilities graphically, plotting the relationship 
between recipients and benefits in two dimensions with one axis marking 
nonmaterial from material benefits and the other distinguishing programs 
benefitting identified individuals from programs designed to benefit a 
group.
  
77 Populating the quadrants yields a helpful preliminary view of the 
major forms that reparation programs have taken thus far.78
 
 
subjects of World War II internments of Japanese Americans). 
  
 74. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988 § 1 (“acknowledg[ing] the fundamental injustice of the 
evacuation, relocation, and internment of United States citizens and permanent resident aliens of 
Japanese ancestry during World War II” and “apologiz[ing] on behalf of the people of the United 
States”); S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009); Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 268–72 
(discussing various forms of reparation and redress); Martha Minow, Breaking the Cycles of Hatred, in 
BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED: MEMORY, LAW, AND REPAIR 14, 23 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 
2002). 
 75. Brooks, The Age of Apology, supra note 71, at 9; De Greiff, supra note 30, at 453; Posner & 
Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 739–41; Rubio-Marín & De Greiff, supra note 54, at 330–32; 
Verdeja, Reparations, supra note 71, at 171–78.  
 76. See De Greiff, supra note 30, at 455–59; Brandon Hamber, Narrowing the Micro and Macro: 
A Psychological Perspective on Societies in Transition, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra 
note 21, at 560, 568–71; Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 736–39.  
 77. Ernesto Verdeja has suggested a similar approach. See Verdeja, supra note 71, at 171–78 
(suggesting a more limited typography of reparations proposals). 
 78. For examples of material and nonmaterial reparations directed at groups and individuals, see 
Colvin, supra note 38, at 195. 
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Other than the dimensional leap, adding payers to the picture appears 
relatively straightforward. After all, individual wrongdoers are not in a 
position to make an official apology or to establish days of remembrance, 
just as the state cannot make personal apologies or payments from 
wrongdoers’ accounts. However, upon closer examination there appears to 
be much more involved than adding a z-axis. There are more variations in 
possible contributors, suggesting a broader spectrum than can be captured 
bimodally. For example, funding for group reparations or trust funds may 
be drawn from public funds, from a particular group, or from individuals. 
A potential w-axis raises similar concerns. Specifically, there is a range of 
relationships with past atrocities that payers might have, running from 
actual participation to complicity, to affiliation with offending groups, or 
to no apparent relationship at all. So, while payers and the relationships of 
payers to past abuses can be viewed graphically, spectrums better capture 
the range of possibilities. 
 
Non-Material 
Benefits 
Individual Recipients 
Material 
Benefits 
Group Recipients 
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Of course, the actual party who bears the cost of a reparations program 
may not be readily apparent. For example, some argue that affirmative 
action programs, while administered generally, may actually impose costs 
only on a relatively small group of individuals who, when not admitted to 
a school or favored with a particular job, claim to have been displaced by 
an affirmative action candidate.79 There are many other distinctions that 
might be made. For example, material payments may be classified as 
settlements without admission of wrongdoing or as forms of atonement 
entailing an apology.80
We are, then, presented with a four-dimensional picture of reparations 
programs. We can locate any particular program as either providing 
material or nonmaterial benefits to individuals or groups by states, groups, 
or individuals who are actually responsible for, merely associated with, or 
 While interesting in their own right, these are 
downstream issues. For now, we can put to use this admittedly schematic 
model to organize a discussion of arguments for and against reparations.  
 
 
 79. Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, note 6, at 713, 729. But see Cheryl Harris, Whiteness as 
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1768 (1993) (arguing that these objections defend background 
racial injustices as status quo). The consequent emotions of resentment that occasion such 
circumstances may seed a backlash of identity politics. See Balfour, Reparations, supra note 6, at 788–
89.  
 80. BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 8–9; Roy L. Brooks, Reply, in 
BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 169–70. 
Spectrum of Payers from State to Individual 
Spectrum of Payers from Guilty to Not Associated 
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not associated at all with past atrocities. It is tempting when presented with 
such a tool to play Linnaeus with actual cases. While engaging as an 
intellectual exercise, that is not the project here. We are out for normative 
rather than descriptive game. In that context, the most immediate question 
is not where a particular program might be located in the overall scheme, 
but the opportunities and challenges salient to any specific location. That 
is the project for the next section.  
B. Major Objections to Reparations 
The mind numbs at the prospect of toiling through the details of the 
thirty-six cells yielded by the outline proposed above. Fortunately, that is 
not necessary. With few exceptions, the main objections to reparations 
programs attach to the category distinctions, and therefore are common 
across the cells in which any one appears. As is evidenced below, this 
analytic approach identifies a few important themes.   
1. Material Reparations 
Reparations advocates frequently argue for some form of material 
response to atrocity.81 Material reparations, whether in the form of cash or 
other compensation, face one main objection: fit. The principal 
justification for material reparations is as compensation for harms 
suffered.82 That begs the question of how harms are measured, suggesting 
an array of counterfactual possibilities, none of which seems fully 
appropriate.83 In language familiar from domestic tort contexts, recipients 
frequently object that the compensation they receive is insufficient to 
make them whole,84 does not adequately account for their loss,85 or is 
nothing more than “blood money.”86
 
 
 81. See, e.g., Brooks, Reparations, supra note 
 Pressing the point farther, some 
6, at 275; Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: 
Japanese Redress and African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 477, 520 (1998). 
 82. MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 104 (1998) [hereinafter 
MINOW, VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS]. 
 83. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 755. 
 84. MINOW, VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS, supra note 82, at 104–05; Balfour, supra note 6, at 
801; Kane, supra note 11, at 197. 
 85. MINOW, VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS, supra note 82, at 104; IFILL, supra note 64, at 24; 
McCarthy, supra note 6, at 755; Anthony Sebok, Reparations, Unjust Enrichment, and the Importance 
of Knowing the Difference Between the Two, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 651, 656–57 (2003). 
 86. Colvin, supra note 38, at 189; Colleen Duggan et al., Reparations for Sexual and 
Reproductive Violence: Prospects for Achieving Gender Justice in Guatemala and Peru, 2 INT’L J. OF 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 192, 210 (2008); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 751; Miller, supra note 6, at 
52–57. 
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critics of material reparations argue that they constitute a “one-time pay-
off trap,”87 essentially closing the door on any subsequent justice claims.88 
Again singing familiar refrains, payers may object that material 
reparations are too generous, too expensive, or not justified in light of the 
harm suffered by recipients.89 There are also broader administrative and 
procedural difficulties with measuring harms,90 which vary dramatically 
between individuals and may become murky with the passage of time.91 
Cast as quasi-tort claims, material reparations also face heavy substantive 
legal burdens that frequently cannot be met.92
There is, of course, a host of other objections to material reparations 
depending upon the combination of other elements, such as who pays and 
who receives the compensation. However, as opposed to nonmaterial 
reparations, the principal concern with material reparations is whether, 
how, and to what extent payments fit the purported harm
  
93 because 
compensation is the raison d’être of material reparations.94 These 
objections connect to debates in critical theory and political science over 
whether to measure social justice in terms of recognition or distribution of 
resources.95 Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, for example, have engaged 
in a book-length debate over whether the fundamental unit of injustice in 
contemporary global society is material or status inequality.96
 
 
 87. McCarthy, supra note 
 If the 
fundamental wrong suffered by victims of injustice is a refusal of 
recognition in cultural and political institutions, then material remedies not 
6, at 756. 
 88. Balfour, supra note 6, at 803; Westley, supra note 62, at 476. 
 89. Miller, supra note 6, at 52–57. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Ryan Fortson, Collective Liability, the Limited Prospects of Success for a Class Action Suit 
for Slavery Reparations, and the Reconceptualization of White Racial Identity, 6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 
REP. 71, 96 (2004). 
 92. In re African-American Slave Descendents Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 759–62 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(Posner, J.); Brophy, supra note 54, at 121–29; Keith Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 
1209 (2004). 
 93. Miller, supra note 6, at 59. 
 94. Emma Coleman Jordan, The Non-Monetary Value of Reparations Rhetoric, 6 AFR. AM. L. & 
POL’Y REP. 21, 25 (2004); Dinah Shelton, Right Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State 
Responsibility, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 833, 844 (2002) (explaining that the purpose of reparations is “to 
rectify the wrong done an injured party and correct injustice by restoring the status quo ante” and 
noting that the International Law Commission has “opted for remedial justice” as the proper ground 
for reparations claims). 
 95. See NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? (2003); AXEL 
HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION (1995); Jürgen Habermas, Struggles for Recognition in 
the Democratic Constitutional State, in MULTICULTURALISM 105 (Amy Guttmann ed., 1994); Charles 
Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM 25 (Amy Guttmann ed., 1994). 
 96. FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 95, at 71. 
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only fail to address the problem,97 but can actually reify the ontology 
underlying the discrimination98 or even inspire backlash.99 Likewise, if the 
manifest harm suffered is simply a matter of unjust denial of access to 
resources, then apologies and days of remembrance are rendered symbolic 
in the pejorative.100
2. Nonmaterial Reparations 
 As is argued here, most abuses perpetrated by 
pretransitional regimes have elements of both distributional and status 
injustice. A successful reparations program must be cognizant of this 
duality. 
Objections to nonmaterial reparations are more multifarious. Those 
asked to give apologies may object that they have nothing to apologize 
for,101 while recipients frequently complain that an apology is not nearly 
enough.102 Establishing a historical record of abuse inevitably casts 
blame—frequently quite broadly—raising objections from those 
implicated who may claim innocence while, again, providing victims at 
most a “symbolic” benefit. Moreover, such histories are by necessity 
incomplete, abstract, and essentializing,103 which may leave many former 
victims without even a sense of recognition,104 raising serious concerns 
about the animating purpose of such programs.105
As constituents of an effort to establish an official narrative, truth 
commissions, public monuments, and days of remembrance meet with 
similar objections.
 
106
 
 
 97. Randall Robinson, What America Owes Blacks and What Blacks Owe to Each Other, 6 AFR.-
AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 1, 12–13 (2004). 
 Those associated with blame may protest innocence. 
 98. Balfour, supra note 6, at 787–89. 
 99. FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 95, at 75–76; Richard Epstein, The Case Against Black 
Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1187–88 (2004); Kane, supra note 11, at 199; Glenn C. Loury, 
Little to Gain, Much to Lose, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER ED., Nov. 8, 2001; Miller, supra note 6, at 46–
47, 48–56; Tracinski, supra note 7, at 146, 156–57. 
 100. FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 95, at 75–76; Balfour, supra note 6, at 794; David Hall, The 
Spirit of Reparation, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 8 (2004). 
 101. Epstein, supra note 99, at 1188; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 715; Eva Jefferson Paterson, 
The Importance of Slavery Reparations, 6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 15, 19 (2004); Tracinski, supra 
note 7, at 146. 
 102. FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 95, at 75–76; Hall, supra note 100, at 8. 
 103. Balfour, supra note 6, at 796–97; Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 665; 
McCarthy, supra note 6, at 768. 
 104. Colvin, supra note 38, at 193. 
 105. See Thomas McCarthy, Vergangenheitsbewältigung in the USA: On the Politics of Memory 
of Slavery, 30 POL. THEORY 623, 638–43 (2002) (arguing for reparations based on capacity of the 
movement to maintain public memory and recognition of past and persisting wrongs). 
 106. Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 390 (1987). 
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Of course, their grousing will be far more muted than it might be if the 
implied findings underlying nonmaterial awards implied a material 
obligation.107 However, the blame and shame entailed in nonmaterial 
reparations still inspires resentment among those whose guilt is 
presumed.108 Further, any implied guilt preserves the sense of insecurity 
among those associated with past wrongs that symbolically recognized 
debts will one day be redeemed in material form.109
Posttransitional preservation and extension of the oppositional logic
  
110 
underlying abuses may also be fed by victims’ resentment. Because 
nonmaterial reparations necessarily are limited and often are perceived by 
victims as incomplete, recipients inevitably will feel that they have not 
been recognized and that their harms have not been fully compensated by 
the very people who perpetrated abuses against them and their kin.111 
Perhaps out of this sense of inadequacy, former victims, their associates, 
and their heirs, may perceive something less than full authenticity in 
claims of regret advanced by those associated with past abuses when all 
they are willing to provide as reparation are monuments, holidays, and 
other purely “symbolic” measures.112
3. Individual Reparations 
 
Objections to reparations programs that focus on individual former 
victims vary according to the form of the program and its awards. 
However, all individually awarded reparations are vulnerable to line-
drawing problems. In an ideal world, transitions would be in a position to 
order or provide reparations for all victims, whether they suffered direct or 
indirect harm. However, transitions present a very imperfect world113
 
 
 107. These concerns led the Senate, in passing a resolution condemning and apologizing for 
slavery and Jim Crow laws, to specifically disclaim any obligation to pay material reparations. See S. 
Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 
 108. Balfour, supra note 6, at 790–95. 
 109. A similar concern motivated “Full Stop,” the termination of trials targeting leaders of the 
Argentine juntas when middle- and lower-ranked military officials became fearful that they might 
become targets for prosecution. See JAIME E. MALAMUD-GOTI, GAME WITHOUT END: STATE TERROR 
AND THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE 63–67 (1996); CARLOS NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL 71, 84–94 
(1996). 
 110. See MALAMUD-GOTI, supra note 109, at 83–91; see also ELSTER, supra note 19, at 93. 
 111. See Nancy Fraser, Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition 
and Participation, in FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 95, at 7, 76–77. 
 112. Hall, supra note 100, at 8. 
 113. Pablo De Greiff, International Courts and Transitions to Democracy, 12 PUB. AFF. Q. 79, 79 
(1998); see also BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 74–75 (1992). 
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characterized by severe material limitations114 made worse by the 
reluctance of payers to sacrifice, often because they feel they are not 
responsible. Any program that provides individual reparations will 
therefore be faced with making choices about whom to compensate for 
which harms and to what degree.115 No matter the decisions made, they 
will inspire objections from someone. Those compensated may object that 
their compensation is incomplete.116 Those not compensated will object 
that their suffering has been denied by implication.117 Those asked to pay 
will express concerns that the net has been cast too widely, including too 
many beneficiaries.118 Others may object that individual reparations come 
at the expense of public projects with greater potential to advance 
collective welfare,119 including the institution-building projects necessary 
to prevent future abuses.120
4. Group Reparations
 
121
While objections to group reparations come from all quarters, the 
driving concern is one of scope.
 
122 Reparations provided to a group as a 
whole fail to distinguish among former victims, providing benefits to all 
members without regard to the degree of harm suffered,123 potentially even 
benefitting some who did not suffer at all or who are themselves 
implicated in abuses.124 This indiscriminate approach to reparations raises 
concerns for victims and payers alike. Affirmative action,125
 
 
 114. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 
 for example, 
16, at 2624–25. 
 115. Colvin, supra note 38, at 201–02; Lisa J. Laplante, The Law of Remedies and the Clean 
Hands Doctrine: Exclusionary Reparation Policies in Peru’s Political Transition, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 51, 52–53 (2007). 
 116. Colvin, supra note 38, at 89–90. 
 117. Balfour, supra note 6, at 797. 
 118. Brophy, supra note 54, at 121. 
 119. Colvin, supra note 38, at 201–02. 
 120. Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black 
Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429, 468 (1988). 
 121. For group-based reparations proposals see RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA 
OWES BLACKS 244–47 (2000) (arguing for group-based reparations for contemporary black 
Americans); Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts? Right the Wrongs of Slavery, 89 GEO. L.J. 
2531, 2554 (2001).  
 122. Epstein, supra note 99, at 1189; Art Alcausin Hall, There Is A Lot to Be Repaired Before We 
Get to Reparations: A Critique of the Underlying Issues of Race that Impact the Fate of African 
American Reparations, 2 SCHOLAR 1, 39 (2000); Kane, supra note 11, at 201. 
 123. Fortson, supra note 91, at 92–95. 
 124. Chad W. Bryan, Precedent for Reparations? A Look at Historical Movements for Redress 
and Where Awarding Reparations for Slavery Might Fit, 54 ALA. L. REV. 599, 610–11, 613–14 
(2003); Miller, supra note 6, at 52. 
 125. Out of concern for some of the difficulties cited here, some scholars have argued that 
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frequently is met with objections from critics on all sides that the access it 
guarantees goes mainly to those who, by virtue of their social, economic, 
and educational backgrounds, do not need the help and therefore take 
opportunities from others who do.126 In response to concerns of this sort, 
Germany limited reparation payments to victims or their direct heirs.127
Standing and privity represent another species of scope objection, 
particularly in conversations about historical reparations. Standing and 
privity are concepts core to stable state contract and tort law, and generally 
limit obligations and claims of benefit to those who directly incurred a 
duty, entitlement, or loss, or those who have a sufficiently close 
relationship with an original claimant or obligor.
 
128 Standing plays a 
spoiler role in reparations debates, challenging recipients to demonstrate 
not only harm, but harm distinct from that suffered by the public at 
large.129 Privity also suggests that only those who suffered direct or 
indirect harm may claim a right to reparation.130 Group reparations 
frequently threaten this intuition by failing to distinguish between victims 
and nonvictims. Privity is particularly relevant in the case of historical 
claims, such as proposals for slavery reparations in the United States. In 
this context, critics ask how “a claimant (or alleged victim) [can] establish 
privity between himself (or his group) and the perpetrator when the latter 
belongs to a different era”131 and judges point out that “there is a fatal 
disconnect between the [slaves] and the plaintiffs.”132
Finally, group-based reparations must confront the twin concerns of 
essentialism and perpetuating a culture of victimhood.
  
133
 
 
affirmative action should not be treated as a form of reparation. See Albert Mosely, Affirmative Action 
as a Form of Reparations, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 353 (2003). 
 Paying 
 126. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 749 (suggesting that this objection can be met by 
justifying group reparations in light of broader social justice goals). 
 127. See BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 12–81. 
 128. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 416 (2004) (“Ordinarily, the obligations arising out of a 
contract are due only to those with whom it is made; a contract cannot be enforced by a person who is 
not a party to it or in privity with it . . . .”); 59 AM. JUR. 2D PARTIES § 34 (2002) (“One cannot 
rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court to enforce private rights, or maintain a civil action for the 
enforcement of such rights, unless one has in an individual or representative capacity some real 
interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the 
controversy.”); 74 AM. JUR. 2D TORTS § 23 (2001) (“Traditionally, to authorize a recovery in tort, 
privity must exist between the act of the wrongdoer and the injury complained of.”). 
 129. Epstein, supra note 99, at 1179–81. 
 130. In re African-American Slave Descendents Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 759–62 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(Posner, J.). 
 131. Brooks, The Age of Apology, supra note 71, at 8; see also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 
723–27. 
 132. In re African-American Slave Descendents Litig., 471 F.3d at 759. 
 133. ERIC YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST-CIVIL 
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reparations to a group ignores differences among individuals in the 
beneficiary group.134 So doing risks reifying and perhaps providing 
renewed legitimacy to the lines of opposition implicated in past abuses.135 
Perhaps more troubling is that beneficiaries may again and forever be 
identified as victims, denying full autonomy to individuals and the 
authority of identity creation to groups.136 For example, Justice Clarence 
Thomas, among others, has argued that affirmative action should be 
abandoned because it casts a shadow over the accomplishments of all 
African Americans and marks blacks as victims, incapable of succeeding 
on their individual merits.137
5. State Sponsored Reparations 
 
The principal objections to state sponsoring of reparations programs 
derive from the fact that funding comes from public coffers and therefore 
implies guilt138 and entails contributions from abusers, purported 
innocents, and even victims who contribute to the public weal.139 While 
the decibel level of complaint goes down in cases of more symbolic 
reparations, it seldom reaches zero because there is still a diversion of 
public resources, whether as money, time, or attention, that might 
otherwise be directed to other public projects.140
There are also a number of theoretical and practical concerns relating to 
state-sponsored reparations that frequently are overlooked. For example, 
when a state pays reparations it assumes the mantle of justice provider, 
which may obscure the role of the state in past abuses.
  
141
 
 
RIGHTS AMERICA (1998); Alfred Brody, The Culture War Over Reparations for Slavery, 53 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1181, 1201, 1209–10 (2004); Tracinski, supra note 
 For those deeply 
7, at 149. 
 134. Balfour, supra note 6, at 790–95. 
 135. Id.; McCarthy, supra note 6, at 767. 
 136. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 768. 
 137. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables: Too Tough? Not Tough Enough!, 5 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 402, 402 n.3 (1987). 
 138. Stacy Elmer, Health Disparities And Historical Injustice In Sierra Leone: A Case For 
Reparations?, 57 U. KANSAS L. REV. 971, 988 (2009); McCarthy, supra note 6 at 757. 
 139. DAVID HOROWITZ, UNCIVIL WARS: THE CONTROVERSY OVER REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY 
12–13 (2002); Brody, supra note 133, at 1203; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 715–16; McCarthy, 
supra note 6, at 755; Tracinski, supra note 7, at 152 (advancing the facially specious argument that the 
United States government cannot be asked to pay reparations for slavery because North and South both 
expended blood and treasure in a Civil War to end slavery); Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: 
An Analysis of Reparations to African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597, 652–54 (1993).  
 140. See Gibson, supra note 9 (quoting Virginia Del. Hargrove for opposition to a proposed 
resolution to apologize for slavery in part on grounds that focusing on the past is “counterproductive”). 
 141. Balfour, supra note 6, at 796. 
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skeptical of state power, particularly in light of past abuses, putting the 
state at the center of reparations programs may expand state power by 
perpetuating a subservient relationship between the state and its 
subjects.142 That continued domination is both physical (victims remain 
dependent upon the state for justice and for material support) and more 
metaphysical—defining former victims as dependants while potentially 
cleansing the state of its role as a moving force behind past atrocities.143
Making the state the primary payer of reparations also puts it in the role 
of final arbiter of who the real victims are, picking winners and losers in 
contests among former victims over limited resources.
  
144 That selection 
process pits victim groups against one another, fragmenting populations 
that might ordinarily form coalitions along aligned interests. Lawrie 
Balfour has suggested that this potential was in full relief in the movement 
for Japanese reparations in the United States where advocates made their 
case for compensating victims of internment during World War II by 
contrasting Japanese Americans with African Americans to suggest that 
the former were intrinsically more deserving than the latter.145
Finally, and from a more practical point of view, some public choice 
theorists have argued that, as the final arbiter of normative change, 
governments may be less likely to support or allow social shifts away from 
abusive practices if the state is required to pay retroactive reparations.
  
146 
The insight is simple: in an environment of rapid social change, if the 
entity negatively affected by the shift has the capacity to stop or delay 
change, then it will be more likely to do so if that strategy will best serve 
its interests. If a state will be called upon to pay reparations posttransition, 
then that serves as motivation to delay, stop, or constrain transitional 
movements and reforms.147
 
 
 142. Id.  
  
 143. Id. at 796–97; see also Brian F. Havel, In Search of a Theory of Public Memory: The State, 
the Individual, and Marcel Proust, 80 IND. L.J. 605 (2005) (discussing how Austria constructed a 
postwar narrative denying state complicity in Nazi crimes). 
 144. Balfour, supra note 6, at 797. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Levmore, supra note 66, at 1687–88. 
 147. Id. at 1687. Levmore’s concern certainly has some anecdotal support. For example, victims 
of internment in the United States during World War II and of the Argentine juntas waited decades for 
reparation. 
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6. Group Sponsored Reparations 
Reparations funded by contributions from the group or groups 
associated with past abuses may cast a smaller net but are still vulnerable 
to protests by group members who claim innocence.148 Those objections 
are twofold. First, those who regard themselves as innocent may object to 
making contributions meant to compensate harms caused by others.149 
Second, they may object to the implication, by association, that they are 
themselves guilty.150
7. Individually Funded Reparations 
 As opposed to state-sponsored reparations, then, 
programs that attempt to tap a narrower group may actually meet with 
louder objection by those who regard themselves as innocent because the 
targeting carries with it an implication of blame that is absent when the 
contributions come from state accounts. That implication of guilt may also 
meet with objections even from those who were perpetrators, for the 
reasons set forth in Part II.B.8.  
Reparations paid by individuals meet a host of justification challenges 
depending on who the individuals are and how they fit in the matrix of 
past wrongs. These are elaborated below, but foremost among them are 
objections relating to selectivity and line drawing. Those actually 
implicated in past abuses cannot object based on innocence or lack of 
responsibility, but may express concerns based on the fact that they only 
did what the law allowed or required and that it would be unfair or unjust 
to hold them solely or individually to account.151 Of course, individuals 
not implicated will object to their being made to bear the burdens of 
compensating for harms caused by others.152 Claims based on unjust 
enrichment may quell the implications of wrongdoing153 but must 
themselves face objections sounding in innocent title.154
 
 
 148. Brody, supra note 
 Finally, no matter 
their relation to past abuses, individuals asked to carry the full weight of 
responsibility for harms perpetrated in the name of a collective enterprise 
133, at 1201 (quoting David Horowitz); Epstein, supra note 99, at 1188; 
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 715–16; Tracinski, supra note 7, at 153.  
 149. Miller, supra note 6, at 52–53. 
 150. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 716. 
 151. Id. at 711; Hylton, supra note 92, at 1222; Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 
691. 
 152. Epstein, supra note 99, at 1188–90. 
 153. Fortson, supra note 91, at 124. 
 154. Sebok, supra note 85, at 655. But see Harris, supra note 79, at 1773–74, 1778–79. 
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supported by a predecessor regime, its laws, and its institutions are bound 
to demand that responsibility be distributed more widely.155
8. Reparations Funded by Perpetrators 
  
Reparations paid solely by those implicated in past abuses solve the 
scope problems suffered by more general funding models but, by virtue of 
that focus, entail discriminate blame of a kind with assignments of 
criminal or tort liability. That leads to objections born of legality, similar 
to those raised against criminal prosecutions in transitions.156 Those asked 
to pay protest that they should not be held legally liable because the 
prevailing law under the abusive regime sanctioned, or at least did not 
punish, their conduct. Legality concerns lead, in turn, to further concerns 
about line drawing that require determining which levels of involvement 
or blame are sufficient to trigger duties of contribution and which are 
not.157 No matter where those lines are drawn, they will meet with 
resentment for at least two reasons. First, these selections, by virtue of 
their selectivity, will face objections of over and under inclusiveness as to 
who suffered and as to who is responsible. Second, those finally 
determined to owe duties of repair inevitably will protest that they have 
been made to carry the water for atrocities that were a function of broader 
social realities, including an abusive regime, its institutions, and its laws. 
That protest implicates again concerns with emphasizing group-based 
oppositions at the center of past wrongs.158 This reification of social lines 
of inclusion and exclusion runs the danger of entrenching rather than 
diffusing social tensions, what Lawrie Balfour, Susan Bickford, and 
Wendy Brown describe as “ressentiment.”159
9. Reparations Funded by Those Associated with Atrocities 
 
For those actually implicated in past wrongs, none of these line-
drawing concerns are resolved by the addition to the pool of payers 
associated but not actually implicated in abuses. Moreover, those captured 
 
 
 155. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 723. 
 156. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2638–42; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 711. 
 157. I address these concerns in the context of criminal trials in Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra 
note 16. 
 158. Brody, supra note 133, at 1201 (quoting David Horowitz); Epstein, supra note 99, at 1187–
88; Kane, supra note 11, at 199; Levmore, supra note 66, at 1689; Loury, supra note 99, at 158; 
Miller, supra note 6, at 46–47; Tracinski, supra note 7, at 146, 156–57. 
 159. Balfour, supra note 6, at 788. 
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by the widened net will repeat now familiar objections. Those merely 
associated with past abuses who are asked to contribute to reparations 
programs will object that they are not those most responsible and that lines 
of obligation should be drawn more narrowly, excluding them, or more 
broadly, including others. Legality concerns, while not completely salient, 
only add fuel to these fires of resentment,160
10. Reparations Paid by those Not Implicated in Past Abuses 
 and, again, resentment raises 
the risk of reinvigorating lines of social opposition implicated in past 
abuses. 
Line-drawing concerns reach their apex in cases where those not 
implicated in past abuses are asked to pay reparations to victims.161 While 
acute in cases of state-sponsored reparations, “It wasn’t me” objections are 
far more powerful where someone not implicated is asked to pay for the 
wrong of another even if the wrongdoer is also made to pay.162
[N]either blame nor punishment are appropriate (i.e., morally 
justified) when a person is not morally responsible for an act in the 
sense . . . . [that] if an act is not the (causal or conventional) result 
of my own, direct bodily movements (or omissions) or if it is not an 
intentional consequence of these movements, then it is not 
appropriate to blame or punish me for the act.
 The source 
of that objection is so ubiquitous that it can make a plausible claim to 
Truth, or at least to being fundamental to the human condition. Manuel G. 
Velasquez puts it as elegantly as anyone, pointing out that: 
163
That a request might be only for a partial contribution may mute some of 
the outrage but certainly does not moot objections from those not 
implicated in past abuses that they simply are not to blame and should not 
be forced to pay for harms caused by another. 
 
11. Persistent Themes 
Several themes emerge from this brief overview. Two deserve 
particular attention. First, whether reparations are symbolic or material, 
there are problems with distribution and fit. Reparations programs may 
 
 
 160. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 707. 
 161. Id. at 715–16. 
 162. See Scalia, supra note 9, at 88. 
 163. Manuel G. Velasquez, Why Corporations Are Not Morally Responsible for Anything They 
Do, in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 111, 115 (Larry May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991). 
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benefit too many or too few, providing benefits that some will find 
insufficient and others will deem excessive. Second, reparations programs 
will face vigorous opposition if contributions are drawn from those who 
claim that they did not do anything wrong.164 This second concern is 
particularly acute in circumstances of historical abuses, where the original 
abusers are long dead.165 “It wasn’t me” objections are not limited to this 
circumstance, however, and even if a reparations program seeks funds 
only from those implicated in past abuses, payers will challenge their 
liability on the grounds that they only did what was expected of them, or at 
least did not violate then-existing law.166
Both of these themes and their variations get traction from problems of 
desert, which bespeaks what Pablo De Greiff has called a juridical bias
  
167 
and treats reparations as special tort awards. On the juridical view, 
reparations seek to compensate for harm measured historically, as status 
quo ante168 or, counterfactually,169 as utinam aliter esset.170 This tort 
model implicates basic moral considerations and fundamental notions of 
fairness171 that, in turn, give substance to the most common objections to 
reparations programs. “It wasn’t me” is only relevant in light of 
background commitments that one should not be held to account for harm 
caused by another and one should not be blamed for doing what, at the 
time, seemed right under the law.172
 
 
 164. Brody, supra note 
 Reparation payments are only 
133, at 1202–06; Brophy, supra note 54, at 121; Posner & Vermeule, 
Reparations, supra note 6, at 703–04; Tracinski, supra note 7, at 151–55. There are many other 
objections that can be made. For example, both victims and contributors might object if the class of 
beneficiaries includes nonvictims or if the nature and degree of benefits does not reflect variations in 
abuses and harms suffered. For present, however, I will limit myself to two of what I take to be the 
most significant objections, noting that the theory developed in the process will provide grounds for 
responding to many other challenges to reparations programs. 
 165. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 757. 
 166. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 711; Hylton, supra note 92, at 1222; Posner & Vermeule, 
Reparations, supra note 6, at 691 (noting that reparations are typically provided “on the basis of 
wrongs that were substantively permissible under the prevailing law when committed”). 
 167. De Greiff, supra note 30, at 451–53; see also McEvoy, supra note 17, at 16. 
 168. See, e.g., Shelton, supra note 94, at 844. While not central to the present analysis, it is worth 
noting that any measure of harm based on status quo ante assumes a historical moment of justice that 
can serve as a point of comparison. In many abusive regimes there is no such moment. See De Greiff, 
supra note 30, at 457; Rubio-Marín & De Greiff supra note 54, at 325. 
 169. Brophy, supra note 54, at 133; Harris, supra note 79; McCarthy, supra note 6, at 755. 
 170. I owe this translation to Professor Andrew Miller by way of our student Katie O’Malley, who 
recommended it to capture the concept of the world as it would have been now had the past event not 
occurred, a sighing comparative measure related to, but distinct from, the more familiar status quo 
ante. See Brophy, supra note 54, at 133; Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 691; Roht-
Arriaza, supra note 35, at 158. 
 171. See Brophy, supra note 54, at 135–36 (advocating for a reparations model focusing on 
assignments of moral culpability). 
 172. Brody, supra note 133, at 1202. 
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inadequate if tied to some claim of harm. Line-drawing problems with 
respect to beneficiaries only matter if there is some sense that only those 
who suffered harm ought to receive compensation and only to the degree 
or extent of their suffering.  
These intuitions are born of an “ethical individualism”173 that is 
foundational to most tort and criminal law,174 not to mention the rule of 
law itself.175 However, they are relevant in the present context only insofar 
as reparations are viewed retrospectively and as compensation for harm. 
That retrospectivity and focus on harm forms the core of the juridical bias. 
That bias reflects a presumption that transitional justice is just a special 
case of ordinary justice176
III. POTENTIAL RESPONSES 
 and reparations in the transitional justice context 
just a special kind of tort award susceptible to constraints familiar from 
criminal law and tort. This Article argues that this bias is misplaced. 
Transitional justice is not just a special case of ordinary justice. Therefore, 
no matter how laudable the moral intuitions of ethical individualism may 
be, they provide no grounds for objecting to well structured and properly 
conceived reparations programs deployed as part of a broader program of 
transitional justice. Part IV charts that course. Before getting there, 
however, it is worth taking a few moments to consider some of the 
alternative approaches proposed in the literature.  
“Responsibility” is a notoriously elusive concept, a fact H.L.A. Hart 
captured in a delightful exercise of ambiguation: 
As captain of the ship, X was responsible for the safety of his 
passengers and crew. But on his last voyage he got drunk every 
night and was responsible for the loss of the ship with all aboard. It 
was rumored that he was insane, but the doctors considered that he 
was responsible for his actions. Throughout the voyage he behaved 
quite irresponsibly, and various incidents in his career showed that 
he was not a responsible person. He always maintained that the 
exceptional winter storms were responsible for the loss of the ship, 
 
 
 173. Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 703; see also McCarthy, supra note 6, at 
759. 
 174. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 246 (1952). 
 175. Tracinski, supra note 7, at 146 (asserting that one of the “basic moral principles at the 
foundation of American law” is “that justice is individual”). 
 176. See, e.g., Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 761 (2004) [hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Ordinary Justice]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010] A NO-EXCUSE APPROACH TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1071 
 
 
 
 
but in the legal proceedings brought against him he was found 
criminally responsible for his negligent conduct, and in separate 
civil proceedings he was held legally responsible for the loss of life 
and property. He is still alive and he is morally responsible for the 
deaths of many women and children.177
Some of the distinctions Hart suggests are quite fine.
 
178 “Responsibility” 
may mean an obligation to compensate for harm because one’s actions 
were culpable, because those actions caused the harm, or simply because 
one has assumed a duty of repair.179 In addition to purely retrospective 
responsibility for past harms, “responsibility” may attach to a condition of 
character or practice, what Manuel G. Velasquez has called 
responsibility’s “aretaic” sense.180
Any claim for reparations must rest on some theory of responsibility. 
As the preceding section revealed, much of the debate about reparations 
assumes that the sense of responsibility germane to transitional justice is 
akin to ordinary justice claims in tort or criminal law. This assumption 
leads most reparations claims into an argumentative or political dead end 
and raises serious practical difficulties. In the remainder of Part III, this 
Article examines some of the most prevalent efforts to avoid this cul-de-
sac and describes how each is insufficient to the meet the unique demands 
of justice in transition. Part IV capitalizes on this discussion to sketch a 
more descriptively appealing and normatively powerful account of 
reparations based on a conception of responsibility tailored to transition.   
 “Responsibility” may also be more 
prospective, as in “the captain is responsible for the safety of his 
passengers and crew.”  
A. Collective Responsibility 
“[M]embership in a collective entity brings with it certain benefits 
and costs, rights and obligations, as incidents of membership. A 
principal reason for forming and joining a collective group is to gain 
certain advantages not available to disassociated individuals. The 
consideration for such advantages gained from group membership is 
 
 
 177. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 211 (1962). 
 178. See, e.g., Michael Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship 49–53 (1984). 
 179. Velasquez, supra note 163, at 112. 
 180. Id. “Aretaic” has ancient roots in Plato and particularly Aristotle, whose work on 
eudaimonism provides the foundation for contemporary virtue ethics propounded by, among others, 
G.E.M. Anscombe, Phillipa Foot, Martha Nussbaum, Linda Zagzebski, Lawrence Solum, and Richard 
Kraut. 
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that burdens incurred or experienced by the collective group may 
fairly be shared by the entire membership. A member cannot fairly 
claim the right to retain membership in the collective entity, 
including any benefits flowing therefrom, while denying any share 
in the burdens of membership.” 
—Kim Forde-Mazrui181
In the face of objections borne of ethical individualism, some 
reparations proponents turn to theories of collective responsibility.
 
182 The 
insight is fairly straightforward. There is no contest that horrific wrongs 
occurred under an abusive regime. Those acts were widespread, 
implicating thousands of individuals and diffusing responsibility. Abuses 
also were institutionalized, and approved or supported by a background set 
of legal and social norms. If those facts make it either unfair or unrealistic 
to identify and hold responsible a discrete set of individuals, then for those 
same reasons it makes sense to hold responsible the group as a whole.183 If 
a group pursued abuses through state institutions, then it likewise makes 
sense to hold the state liable for resulting harms.184
Shifting from individual to collective responsibility has a number of 
salutary effects. First, it limits claims for reparation to the group or the 
state, thereby avoiding most line-drawing problems. Second, because no 
individuals are held personally liable, defenses based on ethical 
individualism appear to melt away. Those advantages are particularly 
evident where the claim for reparation is based on unjust enrichment.
  
185 In 
general, unjust enrichment claims focus on redistribution of resources 
rather than blame,186 rendering irrelevant assertions of personal 
innocence.187
 
 
 181. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 
 Measuring unjust enrichment on a group, rather than 
24, at 717–18. 
 182. See, e.g., JASPERS, supra note 15, at 25; Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries 
of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959 (1992); George Fletcher, Liberals and Romantics at War: The 
Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499 (2002); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 715–26; 
Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 133 (Larry 
May & Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991); Heinrich Gomperz, Individual, Collective and Social 
Responsibility, 49 ETHICS 329, 333 (1939); McCarthy, supra note 6, at 756–58; Miller, supra note 6, 
at 72–73; Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 202–28.  
 183. See Brooks, supra note 6, at 276. 
 184. See McCarthy, supra note 6, at 762; Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 215–16. 
 185. See, e.g., Bernard Boxill, Morality of Reparation, 2 J. SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 113, 120 
(1972); Hanoch Dagan, Restitution and Slavery: On Incomplete Commodification, Intergenerational 
Justice, and Legal Transitions, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1139 (2004); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 694–
710; see also Fortson, supra note 91, at 80. 
 186. See Brooks, supra note 6, at 284. 
 187. Fortson, supra note 91, at 111–15, 123–24. 
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individual, basis makes matters even more comfortable for individuals 
since nobody’s personal property or wealth is singled out as being the 
product of atrocity.  
For example, in a recent article on domestic claims for material 
reparations, Kim Forde-Mazrui contends that slavery and subsequent 
practices of racial discrimination implicate American society at large.188 
Contesting popular conceptions that intense racial discrimination is limited 
to Southern states, she contends that current disparities in achievement 
between whites and blacks are “not surprising,”189 but are bound to a set of 
racist practices to which American society at large subscribed and from 
which the nation as a whole has profited.190 Signaling basic agreement, the 
United States Senate recently found that “African-Americans continue to 
suffer from the consequences of slavery and Jim Crow laws.”191 Evidence 
supporting that view is striking. As Randall Robinson has pointed out, 
while black Americans account for only fourteen percent of nonviolent 
drug crime, they represent seventy-five percent of prison admissions for 
nonviolent drug crime.192 Thomas McCarthy recounts the history of 
housing law and practice in the United States, describing how segregation, 
redlining, and exclusion from historic federal housing programs has 
resulted in a tremendous wealth gap in the United States along racial 
lines.193 Relying on “corrective justice,” Professor Forde-Mazrui 
concludes that since all of America engaged in racial discrimination from 
its inception, all of America is responsible for contemporary harms caused 
by that discrimination.194 Thus, “[e]ach American child born today into a 
life worse off than it would be had society not practiced slavery, 
segregation, and other discrimination, or had society adequately remedied 
their effects, is a new individual victim of societal discrimination” entitled 
to redress based on that counterfactually measured harm.195
Ryan Fortson takes a different, but related, tack, relying on Cheryl 
Harris’s groundbreaking work on the property value of racial identity.
  
196
 
 
 188. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 
 
Fortson argues that contemporary material disparities between groups 
24, at 698, 716–20. 
 189. Id. at 704. 
 190. Id. at 694–710; see also Fortson, supra note 91, at 80. 
 191. S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 192. Robinson, supra note 97, at 2. 
 193. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 758–64. 
 194. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 708–09. 
 195. Id. at 708–09; see also Harris, supra note 79, at 1784. 
 196. Harris, supra note 79, at 1784; see also Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 280. 
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reflect a property interest enjoyed by the dominant or oppressive group.197 
On his view, as on Forde-Mazuri’s, that property interest is best addressed 
by group-level redistribution of material and opportunity resources.198
This associational view of collective responsibility is echoed in the 
literature on moral taint.
 
199 Moral taint relies on linking the pride one often 
feels for accomplishments of a group or its members to the shame one 
ought to feel for harms caused by a group or associates.200 This taint is 
independent of any causal connection to harm. So, moral taint theorists 
conclude, one can feel shame for the crimes of a child, sibling, or friend 
even if one has no knowledge of or connection to those acts.201
A more sophisticated view of collective responsibility that bears some 
resemblance to moral taint relies on the existential fact of membership. 
For example, Amy Sepinwall argues that groups exist only by virtue of the 
voluntary association of their members.
  
202 To persist over time, groups 
must recruit new members. All groups have a history, some good, some 
bad, and that history implies both benefits and burdens. From this, 
Sepinwall argues, it follows that present-day members of a group bear 
responsibility for duties of repair owed by the group because it is their 
very membership in the group that allows it to exist and persist.203
The application of collective responsibility and moral taint to claims 
for reparation is obvious. To the extent those asked to pay are identified, at 
least in part, according to membership in a group whose members 
perpetrated atrocities, those payers are tainted and should contribute to 
reparations in order to recognize and cleanse that taint.
  
204
To start, reparations claims that rely on contemporary disparities in 
achievement or wealth still bear a burden of showing a causal connection 
to the history of abuse. That may be a difficult task, particularly in cases 
 However, there 
are a number of difficulties with resting reparations claims on grounds of 
collective responsibility, many of which derive from the ethical 
individualism group liability hopes to avoid.  
 
 
 197. Fortson, supra note 91, at 111–15. 
 198. Id. at 111, 114–27. 
 199. See, e.g., KUTZ, supra note 25, at 113; OSHANA, supra note 25, at 76; Appiah, supra note 25, 
at 185; May, supra note 25, at 151 (1992); Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 216–28. 
 200. See JASPERS, supra note 15, at 73; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 717–18; H. D. Lewis, 
Collective Responsibility (A Critique), in COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 17, 19–21 (Larry May & 
Stacey Hoffman eds., 1991). 
 201. David Kaczynski cited moral taint as his motivation for turning in his brother Ted, the famed 
“Unabomber,” to authorities. OSHANA, supra note 25, at 72. 
 202. Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 202–05. 
 203. Id. at 191, 205–08.  
 204. OSHANA, supra note 25, at 76. 
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where reparations claims are based on historical wrongs. The offer of 
proof is usually statistics documenting disparities in wealth, achievement, 
or opportunity, and the verdict depends on inferring a causal 
connection.205 However, correlation does not entail causation.206 That 
fallacy presents a particular danger to material reparations programs, 
including affirmative action, because awards made to groups and 
institutions necessarily devolve upon individuals. As Judge Posner put the 
point in In re African-American Slave Descendents Litig., “[t]here is no 
way to determine that a given black American today is worse off by a 
specific, [calculable] sum of money (or monetized emotional harm) as a 
result of the conduct of one or more of the defendants.”207
This is yet another instance of the by now familiar objection that 
reparations ought not to benefit those who have not suffered harm and 
certainly should not go to those whose hands are not clean.
  
208 As Judge 
Posner suggests, reparations claims implicate a potential beneficiary’s 
personal history. In the case of historical wrongs, that history may involve 
so many variables that it becomes impossible to disentangle the impact of 
personal decisions, talents, and ambitions from external constraints 
imposed by an abusive regime. That leaves reparations programs 
vulnerable to arguments that any potential beneficiary’s contemporary 
material conditions are the consequence of mistakes and failures of his or 
her forebears.209
Just as group reparations devolve upon individuals, collective duties to 
fund reparations ultimately fall on individual members, even if only in the 
form of taxes. This again implicates complicated personal narratives, 
particularly in the case of historic wrongs where disparities in wealth 
provide primary evidence of abuses. Some potential contributors will 
argue that their personal success is consequent of hard work, not injustice. 
Alternatively, members of the payer group may acknowledge that their 
 In this context, the successes of some members of a 
targeted group during the history of an abusive regime may be used to 
argue that a potential beneficiary’s situation is not a result of social 
injustice at all, but a personal failure on his part or that of his forebears.  
 
 
 205. See, e.g., S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009); McCarthy, supra note 6, at 758–64; 
Robinson, supra note 97, at 2; see generally Sebok, supra note 85.   
 206. See Bruce Sacerdote, Slavery and the Intergenerational Transmission of Human Capital 
(Sept. 10, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.dartmouth.edu/~bsacerdo/wpapers/ 
Slavery3.pdf) (arguing that the economic effects of slavery dissipated several generations ago). 
 207. In re African-American Slave Descendents Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 2006) (Posner, 
J.).  
 208. See Laplante, supra note 115, at 52–53. 
 209. See, e.g., Tracinski, supra note 7. 
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wealth is in part a function of historical wrongs but maintain that for them 
this is a matter of moral luck,210 providing ground to argue that they are 
not “responsible” for duties of repair because they are not to blame. 
Setting aside blame in favor of claims based on unjust enrichment are 
unlikely to move the conversation very far in light of the common law bar 
of innocent title.211
Collective responsibility advocates confronted with these responses 
inevitably cry foul, pointing out that these critiques revert to the normative 
vocabulary of ethical individualism and therefore constitute a non 
sequitur.
 
212 However, it is not at all clear that this is responsive. What 
these practical objections reveal is a conceptual error at the core of 
collective responsibility: groups do not act, only individuals act.213 While 
internal decision structures may allow individuals to commit structured 
groups to courses of action,214
First, because a collectivity cannot act, it frequently is the case that the 
conduct of individuals cannot rightly be attributed to the whole. At the 
very least, making that case will require demonstrating that the actions of 
those individuals were directed or condoned according to the rules of 
internal decision making that governs the group.
 those decisions are made by individuals and 
those initiatives can only be carried out by individuals. That simple fact 
has two consequences.  
215 That may be easy for 
corporations, but it becomes much more difficult for states and impossible 
for ethnic or religious groups.216
Second, the fact that there often is diversity in the relationships 
between individual members of a group and abuses purportedly committed 
 Therefore, collective responsibility and 
moral taint are simply too blunt to serve as tools for distributing duties of 
repair that will be borne by individuals directly or derivatively. After all, 
literal application will capture for equal blame, by virtue of ethnicity or 
other group affiliation, full-fledged abusers, those who simply did not 
know what was afoot, and those who battled heroically, perhaps at great 
personal peril, to prevent or limit the impact of abuses perpetrated by 
others.  
 
 
 210. On the question of moral luck, see Williams & Nagel, supra note 3. I am in debt to my 
student Adam Sharpe for our exchanges on this point. 
 211. Sebok, supra note 85, at 655. 
 212. JASPERS, supra note 15, at 84–91; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 724–25. 
 213. See JASPERS, supra note 15, at 33–36; Lewis, supra note 200, at 20; Velasquez, supra note 
163, at 124. 
 214. See, e.g., French, supra note 182. 
 215. Id. at 133. 
 216. JASPERS, supra note 15, at 33–36. 
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in the name of that group reveals a devolution problem at the core of 
collective responsibility. Put succinctly, just because the conduct of some 
individuals is attributed to a corporation or group does not mean that the 
consequences as duties of repair can rightly fall upon all members, many 
of whom may be innocent. Advocates might respond that such disparities 
are of no consequence in light of failures by the group and its individual 
members to protect oppressed populations217 or the fact that they have 
allowed the group to persist.218
The conceptual difficulties with collective responsibility are not limited 
to actus reus. To make a claim of group liability requires some theory of 
mens rea as well. Again advocates must confront the fact that groups can 
only act through individuals. This presents one of two options. First, 
collective responsibility advocates can assume that each agent’s acts 
reflect his individual mental state. However, to do so would be to revert to 
individual responsibility, opening the door to objections based on ethical 
individualism that theories of collective responsibility seek to avoid. 
Alternatively, advocates can embrace some theory of collective 
consciousness exercised through agents akin to the way that our individual 
intentions are exercised through our hands. This view is hard to square 
with subjective experience and closely held commitments to free will.
 However, that requires reliance on a theory 
of liability by omission, which is no small feat, and further ignores the fact 
that some group members may in fact have been moral heroes who fought 
against policies of slavery, segregation, or torture but simply failed to stop 
abuses. 
219 
Even were one to accept such a notion, however, it appears that any 
collective consciousness engaged in targeted atrocities has a ready defense 
of mistake.220
Atrocities on a scale warranting transitional justice rely on a belief that 
victims are rightly the objects of abuse, sometimes as a matter of 
convenience, but more often because victims are regarded as less than 
human
  
221 or as posing an imminent threat.222
 
 
 217. See, e.g., Forde-Mazrui, supra note 
 To hold a group responsible 
for abuses perpetrated under the influence of such false beliefs requires 
holding that group liable for the beliefs themselves. That, in turn, requires 
identifying a moment in the historical genesis of those beliefs when it can 
24, at 722. 
 218. See, e.g., Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 213–15. 
 219. See generally Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, supra note 3. 
 220. I am in debt to Ronald Dworkin for conversations and exchanges on this point. 
 221. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 623, 632–33 (noting “scientific” rationalizations for slavery and 
anti-Semitism). 
 222. See Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2629–42; infra Part IV.A. 
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rightly be said that the group as a whole acted willfully, knowingly, or at 
least recklessly in allowing itself to pursue an epistemic path to 
atrocities.223
Among others, Amy Sepinwall and Thomas McCarthy offer a potential 
response.
 That is a hard story to tell. Moreover, it entails a regress that, 
even if not infinite, is bound to extend to a time long before contemporary 
constituents of the group were around. This puts collective responsibility 
advocates on the hook for not just a theory of collective consciousness, but 
also for a theory of group identity over time sufficiently robust to capture 
as one hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of individuals separated by 
space, time, and experience.  
224 Assuming as an abstract matter that groups can maintain 
continuous identity over time,225 these scholars argue that those who 
associate themselves with a group and claim the benefits of membership 
must also assume the burdens of that association, including responsibility 
for past wrongs.226 This view certainly has some footing in corporate law, 
where companies routinely are held liable for the conduct of predecessor 
entities.227
First, transitional regimes are defined in opposition to the very conduct 
of their predecessors that gives rise to reparations claims.
 However, this approach to collective responsibility fails to 
appreciate the nature of transitions, fails to address critical questions about 
the terms of membership in the relevant group, and endorses an account of 
historical-group responsibility that is far too dangerous to garner support 
in the context of transitional justice debates.  
228 Therefore, it 
is not at all clear that a theory of group identity over time would apply in 
transitions.229
Second, the most common targets for collective responsibility are 
states, racial groups, or ethnic groups.
  
230
 
 
 223. See generally Rosen, supra note 
 For most members of these 
groups, membership is a matter of birth. As a consequence, there is no 
moment of voluntary association upon which advocates can rest claims of 
3. 
 224. See, e.g., Forde-Mazrui, supra note 24, at 717–18; McCarthy, supra note 6, at 757–58; 
Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 205–09. 
 225. Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 202–03. 
 226. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 757–58; Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 205–09. 
 227. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 825 (N.J. 1981) (“[W]here one 
corporation acquires all or substantially all the manufacturing assets of another corporation, even if 
exclusively for cash, and undertakes essentially the same manufacturing operation as the selling 
corporation, the purchasing corporation is strictly liable for injuries caused by defects in units of the 
same product line . . . .”). 
 228. RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 28–33 (2002). 
 229. For an argument in favor of holding successor regimes liable for the debts incurred by their 
forbears, see Gray, Devilry, supra note 44, at 147–57.  
 230. See, e.g., Sepinwall, supra note 6, at 209. 
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responsibility for the group. Reversion to implied consent is of little 
assistance in light of the fact that exiting one’s racial or ethnic identity is 
impossible and exiting one’s state of birth practically so.231
Third, and most troubling, is that the associational view of group 
responsibility seems to endorse group consciousness and a brand of group 
responsibility that is heavily implicated in atrocities. The Balkans provide 
the most ready example,
  
232 but many atrocities are driven at least in part 
by a sense of duty held by members of one group to seek justice for 
historical offenses.233
A moment’s reflection on the foregoing discussion reveals that the real 
problem with reparations claims based on theories of collective 
responsibility is that they run aground on the same shoals upon which 
individually oriented theories founder. Most objections to reparations 
programs rest on the presumption that reparations claims are meant to 
compensate for past harms.
 Therefore, unless one is willing to endorse the 
theory behind intergenerational blood feuds, reserving criticism only for 
methods, it is hard to endorse collective responsibility as a ground for 
reparations. 
234
B. Atonement  
 Reparations theories that appeal to 
collective responsibility confront similar or identical objections because 
they embrace, rather than examine, this retrospective bias and commitment 
that reparations are a form of compensation for harm. These conceptual 
choices make inevitable the practical objections set forth here. Those 
objections can only be avoided if reparations advocates take seriously the 
source and nature of pretransitional abuses and the liminal position of 
reparations in the context of a broader effort to achieve justice in 
transition.  
Some reparations advocates recognize the dangers of applying 
compensatory frameworks familiar from ordinary justice to transitional 
circumstances. For many of the reasons discussed above, these theorists 
 
 
 231. For a useful overview of the debate, see Linda Barclay, Liberalism and Diversity, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY 155 (Jackson & Smith eds., 2005). 
 232. Richard Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in ON HUMAN RIGHTS 111, 
112–15 (Shute & Hurley eds., 1993). 
 233. DANIEL GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE 
HOLOCAUST 27–163, 416–54 (1996); PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT 
TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 47–62, 96–131 
(1998); MINOW, VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS, supra note 82, at 10–11. 
 234. See infra Part II.B. 
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conclude that retrospective tort models “undermine [social] harmony and 
reconciliation,” “result in an insufficient development of the historical 
record,” and suffer a “moral deficiency” by mistaking compensation for 
acceptance of responsibility.235 As an alternative to retrospective 
compensation, some of these critics argue for a model of reparation as 
atonement and redress. As described by one of its most sophisticated 
advocates, the “atonement model is crafted from th[e] post-Holocaust 
spirit of heightened morality, identity between victim and perpetrator, 
egalitarianism, and restorative justice.”236
Atonement theories are entirely prospective
  
237 and focus on achieving 
reconciliation between former abusers and victims.238 The core of the 
model is a substantial apology composed of “(1) confess[ion] of the deed, 
(2) admi[ssion] that the deed constitutes an atrocity, (3) repent[ance], and 
(4) ask[ing] for forgiveness.”239 So conceived, symbolic reparations are 
not merely hollow efforts to fill compensation gaps; rather, they reflect 
“remorse,” the “taking [of] personal responsibility,” and a sincere effort at 
reconciliation.240 As opposed to ordinary justice approaches, atonement 
regards material reparations not as compensation for harms suffered, but 
as a “tangible . . . redemptive act . . . [that makes] the apology 
believable”241; reparations are not “punishment for guilt, but rather, [they 
are] an acknowledgement of guilt.”242
The instinct to turn away from ordinary justice models of retrospective 
compensation in favor of a more prospective focus on transitional goals of 
social healing and reconciliation is laudable. Unfortunately, putting the 
weight of reparation programs on apology and forgiveness commits 
advocates to conceptual constraints that render the entire approach 
practically naïve and potentially oppressive. These difficulties become 
apparent upon closer investigation of the internal dynamics of atonement.  
  
 
 
 235. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 65 (2004); see also Anthony J. Sebok, Two 
Concepts of Injustice in Restitution for Slavery, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1405, 1424–27 (2004). 
 236. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 66. 
 237. Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 255. 
 238. See, e.g., BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH, supra note 6, at 6–7; Brooks, Perpetrator-
Focused, supra note 11, at 63; Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 254, 273–79; Miller, supra note 
6, at 71–79; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 35, at 159; Lewis Beale, Seeking Justice for Slavery’s Sins, L.A. 
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2002, at 1 (quoting Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, plaintiff in In re African-American 
Slave Descendents Litig., 471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
 239. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 67. 
 240. Id. at 67; see also Sebok, supra note 235, at 1424–27. 
 241. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 67. 
 242. Id. 
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The acceptance of responsibility at the heart of the atonement model is 
akin to what Karl Jaspers has called “moral guilt” in that it is internal and 
can only be assessed internally.243 That is, as compared to criminal guilt, 
which is determined and imposed externally regardless of the criminal’s 
acceptance of responsibility,244 the moral guilt that gives rise to apology is 
wholly a function of subjective acceptance of responsibility. Apologies 
therefore cannot be demanded. By definition, they must be internally 
generated, spontaneous, and reflect a genuine acceptance of 
responsibility.245 The internal genesis of apology is crucial to atonement 
theory and marks the distinction for advocates between punishment and 
acceptance of guilt.246 The atonement approach therefore avoids “It wasn’t 
me” objections born of ethical individualism by persuading those asked to 
pay or support reparations that, in fact, it was them.247 Advocates further 
contend that this brand of spontaneous and genuine apology provides a 
more promising basis for social reconciliation, healing, and reconstruction 
than tort-based models.248
However attractive atonement and apology may be in the abstract, this 
approach to reparations raises daunting practical concerns. Principally, 
because apology and atonement are tied to spontaneous subjective mental, 
ethical, and moral states,
  
249
 
 
 243. JASPERS, supra note 
 there can be no procedural guarantees of 
success. No matter how comprehensive a truth commission or other 
process might be, it may reach its conclusion and still find a recalcitrant 
abuser who clings to the fiction of his innocence, is steadfast in his belief 
of entitlement in past abuses or present enrichment, or for any other reason 
declines or refuses to apologize and pay material reparations. Ironically, 
then, atonement advocates ultimately seem to assume or endorse, rather 
than avoid, basic principles of ethical individualism. As a consequence, 
when faced with a contumacious abuser, any model that depends upon 
apology for its success has no way to proceed. Any enforcement 
15, at 25–26.  
 244. Id. at 25. 
 245. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 64; see also Jean Hampton, Correcting 
Harms vs. Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1677 (1992). 
 246. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 67. 
 247. See, e.g., Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 66–67; Matsuda, supra note 106, at 
390; see also Hampton, supra note 245, at 1677. 
 248. See STRAWSON, supra note 3, at 191 (noting that “to forgive is to accept the repudiation and 
to forswear the resentment [of a wrong done]”); Fortson, supra note 91, at 123; Richard Weisman, 
Showing Remorse at the TRC: Towards a Constitutive Approach to Reparative Discourse, 24 
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 221 (2006). 
 249. STRAWSON, supra note 3, at 191; Hampton, supra note 245, at 1677. 
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mechanism, whether carrot or stick, taints the apology and renders it 
insufficient to the task of atonement.250
Whether viewed in the abstract or through the lens of history, the 
practical likelihood that abusers will refuse to apologize is quite high, 
suggesting that sincere apology is and will be the exception rather than the 
rule.
  
251 Foremost among these concerns is the obvious psychological stake 
that former abusers have in avoiding acceptance of responsibility. 
Atonement requires that former abusers acknowledge and accept 
responsibility for horrific acts of violence. Given how hard it is for most 
people to truly accept responsibility for minor offenses and sexual 
dalliances, it is hard to imagine that perpetrators of murder, rape, torture, 
and genocide will be ready and willing to confront their past acts with 
sufficient depth and honesty to offer the kind of apology atonement 
requires. Such apologies are certainly the exception in the case of stable 
state crimes, not the rule. Even where guilt is admitted, offenders routinely 
seek refuge from full accountability in their upbringing or their social and 
economic circumstances.252 Participants in mass atrocities have a more 
persuasive case on this score than most. Whether true believers, followers, 
or abettors, participants in mass atrocities act within background social 
norms and black letter law that presents targeted violence as right, 
necessary, or at least not illegal.253 That fact provides a ready and 
psychologically appealing option to full and honest apology: blaming the 
system. That remains a common defense in the United States for those 
who owned slaves,254 participated in Jim Crow laws, and it is even 
advanced as an excuse for those who participated in lynching.255
The natural psychological resistance to admitting participation in 
unfathomable evil is only stronger when coupled with the prospect of 
material loss. Central to the case for atonement is the necessity that 
apology be made manifest in the form of material reparation.
 
256
 
 
 250. Roy Brooks, for one, admits this limitation. See Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 
 The 
11, 
at 67. 
 251. For example, some of the most high-profile perpetrators of abuses during Apartheid refused 
to participate in the South African Truth and Reconciliation process. See ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY 
UNMASKED, 216–20, 257, 303–05 (2000). 
 252. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661 (2000) (allowing judges to consider a defendant’s background in 
sentencing); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
 253. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2629–36 (arguing that, while an excuse based on 
background norms has no moral validity, it does have legal weight under the principle of legality in the 
form of a duty of fair warning).  
 254. See David Lowenthal, Thomas Ruffin And The Perils Of Public Homage: On Arraigning 
Ancestors: A Critique Of Historical Contrition, 87 N.C. L. REV. 901, 935 (2009). 
 255. IFILL, supra note 64, at 17, 64–66. 
 256. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 67. 
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sacrifice entailed by material reparations stands as a significant barrier to 
apology. For example, passage of the 2009 resolution apologizing for 
slavery by the United States Senate was only possible when sponsors 
added language disclaiming any obligation to pay material reparations.257 
Fears of material sacrifice also played an important role in South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which famously offered amnesty 
from criminal and civil liability in exchange for public admission of 
participation in Apartheid abuses.258
In short, while we might hope that the process of transition will inspire 
some to take responsibility for their contributions to past abuses and to 
express those sentiments by apologizing and making sincere offers of 
material reparation, experience and common sense suggest that this will be 
the exception rather than the rule. The atonement model, while attractive 
in the abstract, therefore holds little practical promise, leaving justice at 
the whim of former abusers who have little motivation to apologize at all, 
much less with the sincerity required to achieve atonement. These 
difficulties are not resolved by turning to collective apologies. Just as with 
other forms of collective responsibility, the expectations and requirements 
of atonement devolve upon individuals. Without the full and meaningful 
engagement of individual citizens, the apologies of political leaders are 
symbolic in the pejorative. 
 It is hard to take too seriously an 
apology given in exchange for protection from material or personal loss.  
These concerns certainly should trouble any advocate of the atonement 
model of reparations. However, the most compelling objections are 
revealed when we turn to the role played by former victims in the 
atonement scheme. According to advocates, atonement is a reciprocal 
relationship between abuser and victim.259 Atonement requires not only a 
sincere, self-generated apology, but also acceptance and forgiveness by 
former victims.260
 
 
 257. See S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 This implies that genuine apology constitutes a 
redeemable claim for forgiveness by a former abuser and a consequent 
duty on the part of victims to forgive. In Brooks’s view, for example, a 
genuine apology coupled with a substantial offer of reparation constitutes 
a “civic subpoena,” imposing upon victims a “civic responsibility to 
forgive and thereby begin the process or repairing a broken 
 258. BORAINE, supra note 46, at 201–02; Colvin, supra note 38, at 193. 
 259. Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 273. 
 260. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 67; Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 
255; Jens Meierhenrich, Varieties of Reconciliation, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 195, 207 (2008). 
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relationship.”261
Like apology, forgiveness is a spontaneous subjective mental state with 
no procedural or ontological predicates.
 This view is not only incoherent, it is oppressive, denies 
the dignity of victims, and constitutes a perpetuation of abuse. 
262 A victim will forgive or not as 
she will; the decision lays solely within her power.263 Forgiveness is never 
owed.264 There are no objective conditions of sufficiency and there 
certainly are no standard conditions the fulfillment of which makes 
forgiveness necessary.265 Furthermore, giving an apology on the condition 
that forgiveness will be owed renders the sincerity of the apology suspect. 
Some victims of atrocity may choose to forgive, but many will not.266 To 
ignore, and thereby fail to respect, the authority of victims not to forgive is 
to deny their dignity and autonomy.267 The oppressiveness of such a 
demand is only magnified if, as Martha Minow has suggested, forgiveness 
entails or invites forgetting past wrongs.268
An objective demand for forgiveness imposes upon the victim a duty 
that is not hers.
  
269 More dangerous still, it implies that the victim is to 
blame if she declines or refuses to forgive. Any effort to enforce an 
obligation to forgive by, say, withholding reparations payments, just 
makes matters worse and carries a flavor of abuse and manipulation. 
Reparations movements simply cannot engage in such behavior and still 
carry the mantle of justice. To claim otherwise, as the atonement model 
does and must in order to pursue its vision of interpersonal 
reconciliation,270
The very idea of demanding apology and forgiveness—and the 
prospect of enforcing those demands—is sufficient to demonstrate that the 
atonement model is in some combination incoherent, oppressive, or facile. 
Such demands simply do not comport with the moral foundations of 
apology and forgiveness. To ignore that incoherence is to engage in a new 
round of abuse. Alternatively, to respect those limitations and simply hope 
that abusers will apologize and victims forgive puts the project of 
 just raises anew the specter of abuse. 
 
 
 261. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 68. 
 262. Panu Minkkinen, Ressentiment as Suffering: On Transitional Justice and the Impossibility of 
Forgiveness, 19 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 513, 515 (2007). 
 263. MINOW, VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS, supra note 82, at 20. 
 264. BORAINE, supra note 46, at 213–14. 
 265. Minow, Memory, supra note 74, at 18. 
 266. Id. 
 267. MINOW, VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS, supra note 82, at 17. 
 268. Id. at 14–19. 
 269. Minow, Memory, supra note 74, at 18. 
 270. Brooks, Perpetrator-Focused, supra note 11, at 67; Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 
255. 
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transitional justice on wholly uncertain grounds without any procedural 
guarantees.271 The only way to avoid both horns of this dilemma is to set 
aside atonement as the organizing goal of transitional justice and 
reparations. Atonement should, of course, be encouraged and celebrated 
where it occurs,272
C. Transformative Justice 
 but it simply cannot carry the normative and practical 
burdens of transitional justice generally and reparations specifically. 
Some scholars have argued for reparations not on terms of 
accountability but with a focus on social transformation.273 Titled 
variously as “transformative justice,”274 “restorative justice,”275 or “social 
healing,”276 these approaches to reparations are mostly or entirely 
prospective277 and consequentialist,278 measured and justified by the larger 
project of “promot[ing] healing”279 or “reconciliation.”280 This is a goal 
shared with atonement theories. However, unlike atonement, 
transformative justice and reconciliation focus less on assuming blame, 
favoring instead the goal of “internal healing.”281
The modern historical genesis of transformative justice is in the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). There, confronted 
with a past marked by institutionalized violence, the newly elected 
representatives of the post-Apartheid government faced the familiar 
questions ubiquitous among transitions: “Shall we punish or offer 
amnesty?” and “Shall we linger on the past or indulge in oblivion and just 
 
 
 
 271. See BORAINE, supra note 46, at 213–14 (noting that many victims of Apartheid chose not to 
forgive their abusers, even after the abusers appeared before the TRC). 
 272. Id. at 214–15. 
 273. See, e.g., IFILL, supra note 64, at 128–31; Eric Yamamoto et al., American Justice on Trial—
Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
1269, 1335 (2003); Eric Yamamoto et al., American Reparations Theory and Practice at the 
Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 52 (2007) [hereinafter Yamamoto et al., American Reparations]. 
 274. See, e.g., Erin Daly, Transformative Justice: Charting a Path to Reconciliation, 12 INT’L 
LEGAL PERSP. 73 (2001–2002)) 
 275. See, e.g., MINOW, VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS, supra note 82, at 91; Laplante & Theidon, 
supra note 46, at 248. 
 276. Yamamoto et al., American Reparations, supra note 273, at 3. 
 277. Matsuda, supra note 106, at 397; cf. Fortson, supra note 91, at 122 (focusing on capacity for 
reparations to effect a redistribution of resources deemed unjust in light of past wrongs). 
 278. Yamamoto et al., American Reparations, supra note 273, at 4 (contending that reparation is 
not an “end in itself, but instead [i]s an integral aspect of the larger project of social healing”). 
 279. Jordan, supra note 94, at 25. 
 280. IFILL, supra note 64, at 131; Meierhenrich, supra note 260, at 196. 
 281. Susan Dwyer, Reconciliation for Realists, 13 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 81, 90, 96 (1999); Jordan, 
supra note 94, at 25. 
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move on?” Relying on indigenous concepts of justice based on “ubuntu,” 
leaders of the transition, most prominently Nelson Mandela, Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, and Alex Boraine, settled on the TRC as the locus of 
transitional justice efforts.282 By design, the TRC traded truth for 
punishment, offering amnesty to all former abusers who came forward and 
offered truthful and complete testimony.283
While ubuntu, both within and between different African traditions, is 
elusive, the fundamental focus is on interconnectedness.
 The hope was that by shining a 
light on the past and removing the threat of prosecution, the TRC could 
transform society and reconcile victims and abusers even if they did not 
apologize and forgive. 
284 Individuals are 
conceived of as artifacts of social connections.285 They feel that 
connection such that they are diminished when others are harmed and 
raised when others are respected.286 The consequence of putting ubuntu at 
the core of transitional justice is to place priority on rebuilding social 
connections among members of society going forward.287 Reconciliation 
and institution building take precedence over punishment. Like atonement, 
reconciliation as a goal for transitional justice puts a priority on outcomes. 
Reparations are part of the process only where and to the extent that they 
may serve the broader goal of reconciliation.288
Some reconciliation scholars are not so outcome oriented. They 
emphasize process and dialogue as the key to reconciliation.
  
289 In this 
context, material reparations may provide an important locus for 
dialogue.290
 
 
 282. BORAINE, supra note 
 That was a self-conscious goal of the TRC, which appreciated 
the importance of letting victims tell their stories in their own words in 
order to provide a moment of recognition. Particularly in the domestic 
251, at 268; DESMOND MPILO TUTU, NO FUTURE WITHOUT 
FORGIVENESS 45 (1999); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the 
‘Rule of Law’”, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2335 (2003) [hereinafter Ehrenreich Brooks]; Promotion of 
National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, reprinted in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, 
supra note 21, at 770, 771, 773 [hereinafter Reconciliation Act]; see also State v. Makwanyane 1995 
(3) SA 391 (CC) at 84–85 (S. Afr.) (Chaskalson, C.J., relying in part on “ubuntu” to hold the death 
penalty unconstitutional). 
 283. Reconciliation Act, supra note 282, at 773. 
 284. TUTU, supra note 282, at 31–32. 
 285. BORAINE, supra note 46, at 215. 
 286. TUTU, supra note 282, at 31–32; Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1 J. GENDER, RACE & 
JUST. 47, 52 (1997). 
 287. TUTU, supra note 282, at 54–55. 
 288. Id. at 45, 61. 
 289. See, e.g., IFILL, supra note 64, at 131. 
 290. Raymond Winbush, Reparations Conference Keynote Speech: Should America Pay?, in 2 
AM. U. MODERN AM. 43, 44 (2006). 
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reparations context, many scholars also highlight the value of keeping 
alive the memory of past abuses and highlighting the need to correct 
present inequities.291 This dialogical process also promises a more 
expansive historical record292 than might be accomplished in the narrow 
confines of criminal trials or tort claims.293 Finally, if they are transparent, 
the procedures designed around reconciliation can model public 
procedures and provide legitimacy for the new regime.294
There is much to recommend reconciliation as a guide in transitions 
generally and for reparations in particular. The principal concerns are 
imprecision and mission creep. As Laurel Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein 
have pointed out, “There is no theoretical foundation that underlies the 
concept of social repair.”
 
295 Too often in elaborating the fundamental 
insights of reconciliation, advocates alternatively collapse into 
atonement296 or indulge in abstractions, failing to describe precisely both 
the unique potential of process and, derivatively, what “reconciliation” 
would mean in light of a commitment to process.297 That leaves 
reparations claims based on reconciliation bereft of clarity as to 
justification and form. As a consequence, familiar objections based on 
ethical individualism make an easy reappearance. These blame games,298 
far from sponsoring reconciliation, only serve to reinforce lines of 
division.299
D. Rapid Social Change 
 
One of the great strengths—and weaknesses—of utilitarian analyses of 
legal issues is that troubling but abstract moral issues seldom gain much 
traction. Given this, it is perhaps ironic that Eric Posner and Adrian 
Vermeule identify “ethical individualism” as a key component of the 
debate about reparations.300
 
 
 291. Paterson, supra note 
 Setting aside these sorts of deontological 
concerns, Saul Levmore argued some ten years ago that reparations and 
101, at 19–20. 
 292. Brophy, supra note 54, at 133; Jordan, supra note 94, at 25. 
 293. IFILL, supra note 64, at 126, 128–31. 
 294. BORAINE, supra note 46, at 175–76; Yamamoto et al., American Reparations, supra note 
273, at 64–74. 
 295. Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the 
Contribution of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573, 618 (2002). 
 296. See, e.g., Meierhenrich, supra note 260, at 206–07 (“Forgiveness is a necessary condition for 
reconciliation . . . .”). 
 297. Id. at 196–97 (citing Dwyer, supra note 281, at 81–82). 
 298. Brophy, supra note 54, at 135–36. 
 299. See Jordan, supra note 94, at 23. 
 300. Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 698. 
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other posthoc compensation policies ought to be features of regulatory 
change.301 Professor Levmore, and others who have looked at the problem 
of retroactivity using tools from law and economics and public choice,302
The insight is straightforward. Assume that widget manufacturing 
requires the combustion of a particularly noxious chemical resulting in the 
release of a carcinogenic agent. Emission control technology is available, 
but would add one unit of cost to each widget, an expense the 
manufacturer cannot pass along to its customers and still remain 
competitive on price. In the absence of regulations limiting emissions or 
requiring controls, the widget manufacturer is a present winner and future 
loser. That is, in the present regulatory environment, polluting reduces 
costs. However, that is a temporary condition. Pollution is not without 
costs; failure to regulate simply shifts those costs to the public. As those 
costs coalesce and become manifest, public policy will shift in favor of 
stricter controls. When that day comes, the widget maker will be forced to 
assume additional costs. Until then, it has no economic reason to adopt 
more costly production methods. In fact, the widget maker has strong 
economic incentives to obstruct and delay as long as it can.  
 
concede that there are elements of unfairness inherent in retroactive 
compensation for violations of “new” norms. Nevertheless, they maintain 
that retroactive reparations ought to be standard policy in some contexts in 
order to encourage anticipatory change.  
From a policy perspective, this familiar incentive structure should find 
no favor. It compromises public interests and imposes costs on innocent 
parties. The solution, Levmore suggests, is retroactive enforcement.303 
Establishing a habit and pattern of retroactive enforcement of new 
regulations protects public interests by changing the incentive structure.304 
Polluters usually have the best information regarding both the impact of 
their practices and the technological options available to diminish those 
impacts. They are, then, in the best position to anticipate regulatory 
changes.305
 
 
 301. Levmore, supra note 
 If polluters know that they will be held accountable for harms 
accruing from the time when they knew or ought to have known about 
production options that cause less environmental impact, then they will 
66. 
 302. See, e.g., DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (2000); Michael J. Graetz, Legal Transitions: 
The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1978); Louis Kaplow, An 
Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986). 
 303. Levmore, supra note 66, at 1657–61. 
 304. Id. at 1663. 
 305. Id. 
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have powerful incentives to regulate their own behavior on an anticipatory 
basis.306
The potential application of this analysis to transitions is obvious. 
Agents and subjects of pretransitional abuse will have less motivation to 
continue abuses and otherwise delay transition if they know that they are 
only adding to the consequences that inevitably will come. Policies of 
retroactive reparation may even encourage earlier adoption of human 
rights practices by adding costs to abusers who choose to delay. By 
contrast, a general environment of impunity that is perfectly respectful of 
basic principles of legality actually encourages abusive regimes to 
continue with their activities and to delay transitional movements at all 
costs.  
 Therefore, an aggressive approach to transition, characterized by 
consistent pattern of implementing legal changes that reflect new 
knowledge and technical capacity, coupled with retroactive enforcement, 
will encourage polluters to react quickly in order to limit their future 
retroactive liability. In the alternative, by delaying changes to the law and 
their own behavior, polluters in an aggressive-change environment only 
increase their future costs. 
While this approach is novel, Levmore recognizes that what may be 
true for regulatory regimes found in stable states does not carry over to the 
dramatic political change entailed in transitions to democracy.307 The rapid 
change hypothesis must assume that there is some external source of 
change that makes liberal revolution and transition a relative certainty 
from the point of view of those perpetrating bad acts under an abusive 
regime.308
 
 
 306. Id. 
 In domestic regulatory environments, certainty of change is 
provided by background regulatory schemes, governmental agencies, 
advocacy groups, laws, and dedicated political units. Together these 
entities ensure that regulations will move toward the “best” standards. To 
posit that same certainty in the transitional justice context it is necessary to 
make three difficult assumptions. The first is that there is a stable 
background of human rights agencies that provide assurance of eventual 
enforcement. Second, agents of abuse must consider themselves to be 
within the present or future control of these agencies. Third, this purely 
economic analysis assumes that abusers act out of self-interest that is both 
narrow—bound to material gain—and enlightened—adopting a relatively 
long-time horizon. None of these assumptions is warranted.  
 307. Id. at 1686–98, 1700. 
 308. Id. at 1690–92. 
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The economic advantage afforded abusers is bound up with sincerely 
held ontological and teleological commitments backed by law.309 These 
abusive paradigms create for abusers a sense of entitlement and rationalize 
abuse by marking victims as lesser beings with a dark future at the end of 
history.310 Consequently, there is much more than material wealth at stake 
in preserving an abusive regime. For abusers, the prospect of social change 
threatens core identities and jealously guarded ways of private and public 
life. Commitments to preserve these lifeways provide a far more powerful 
motive to maintain conditions of injustice than can be overcome by banal 
material interests or even the abstract threat of punishment.311
Assumptions about the inevitability of social change are also suspect in 
the context of pretransitional regimes. While the period since the 1948 
signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has marked a new 
era in internationalism and the progressive advancement of an 
international system of human rights norms and transnational agencies 
charged with reviewing and encouraging respect for these norms, there is 
no organization with sovereign reach and authority sufficient to guarantee 
the prosecution and punishment of all human rights violations.
 
312 Without 
some certainty of both a normative shift toward the “best” laws and 
eventual retroactive enforcement of these norms, the aggressive-change 
hypothesis simply does not work for abusive regimes.313
The subjective positions of abusers in pretransitional regimes further 
indicate that the cognitive processes that ground the aggressive-change 
hypothesis are not present in abusive regimes. Followers and leaders are 
unlikely to see themselves as living under the authority of an international 
or transnational human rights regime.
 
314 This is in part due to the reality of 
the international system. It is also a reflection of the immediate 
environment in abusive regimes. Most abusers are not high-level leaders 
but, rather, are beholden to more immediate institutional norms supported 
and enforced by an abusive regime.315
 
 
 309. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 
 Leaders, while perhaps directly 
16, at 2629–36. 
 310. Id. at 2632–34. 
 311. Id. at 2670: see also Ehrenreich Brooks, supra note 282, at 2305. These matters often are 
complex. For example, Thomas Jefferson and George Washington, with many of their contemporaries, 
admitted the evils of slavery but nevertheless could not bring themselves to abandon the practice for 
fear of social and personal cost.  
 312. The International Criminal Court aspires to this role, but is saddled with limited jurisdiction 
constrained by the consent of signatory nations. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
July 17, 1998, art. 4, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (2002). 
 313. Levmore, supra note 66, at 1680. 
 314. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2667–76. 
 315. Id. at 2671–72. 
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exposed to international human rights institutions, are likely to see 
themselves as immune from international agents and as preserving a way 
of life in which they and their followers are deeply invested.316 Given 
these dispositions, abusers are likely to fight at all costs to stop liberal 
revolutions and transitional movements that present a direct threat to their 
beliefs, authority, wealth, and personal security.317 Moreover, they have 
more capacity to thwart transitions than do bit players in regulatory 
schemes.318
The aggressive-change hypothesis also makes assumptions about the 
shared interests and motives of those in a regulatory environment that may 
not be apt in the transitional justice context. While it may be true that 
governments, regulatory agencies, watchdog groups, and industries have a 
set of shared interests that binds them together, this cannot be said of 
abusers and the international human rights community. According to 
aggressive change, industries and their regulators see their enterprises in 
terms of long-term costs and benefits. Abusers do not see the world this 
way. For abusers, anticipating change to reflect international human rights 
norms is not a way to continue their business; it is the end of their 
particular enterprise.
 While a widget manufacturer knows that an anticipatory shift 
in behavior will further his interests, the despot and his followers face 
quite different consequences. Rather than merely altering their market, 
anticipatory change guarantees total loss and potential criminal 
prosecution.  
319
Some argue, not without merit, that amnesties and pardons are seldom 
the key factors in catalyzing transitions, which may suggest that the threat 
of obstruction suggested here is overblown.
 A power plant would not anticipate regulatory 
shifts to the point of closing its doors. We certainly would not expect a 
successful abusive regime to close shop even if abusers know, in their 
deepest hearts, that their regime one day will fall.  
320
 
 
 316. Id. at 2676. 
 A transition might, indeed, 
be a historical inevitability, but leaders in the outgoing regime usually do 
not see things this way. If leaders and other contributors to an abusive 
regime are facing retroactive liability for reparations, then they have every 
motivation to delay the transition by whatever means, and they are in a 
 317. José Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: 
Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, in 1 TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 3, 18–20 (Neil J. Kritz 
ed., 1995). 
 318. Levmore, supra note 66, at 1680. 
 319. IFILL, supra note 64, at 17, 43–44, 64–66. 
 320. See, e.g., Douglass Cassel, International Truth Commissions and Justice, 5 ASPEN INST. Q. 
77 (1993). 
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position to add significantly to transitional costs even if they cannot stop 
the transition altogether.321
Levmore, at least, shares in these concerns and therefore concludes that 
reparations are only advisable in the transitional justice context after a 
sufficient period of repose during which time the legal and social changes 
attending transition have become well established.
 It is important to keep in mind that these costs 
do not accrue to the international community. It seems unfair to establish 
international policies based on abstract theory when the potential cost in 
blood will be borne by an already victimized population.  
322 However, there may 
be one exception to this. International agents who benefit from human 
rights abuses, such as corporations and financial institutions, may be 
deterred from future dealings with abusive regimes if the international 
human rights community, including states, transnational organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, consumers, and stockholders, can 
establish reliable precedents for detecting and “punishing” beneficiaries 
and opportunists in the business world.323 Financial institutions might, as 
an example, be motivated to use their informational advantage to avoid 
dealing with human rights abusers if they know that they will be found out 
and made to pay. Actions like those recently brought against Swiss banks 
by Holocaust survivors might create just the reliable regulatory 
environment that the aggressive-change hypothesis requires with respect 
to truly international actors.324
 
 
 321. Foday Sankoh represents a significant present-day example of this. He was able to exercise 
considerable influence over the terms of the Lome Peace accords precisely because he represented a 
present threat to peace and stability in Sierra Leone and because he approached the peace negotiations 
with the subjective belief that he could fight into perpetuity if necessary rather than sacrifice his 
primary goals of power-sharing, amnesty, and control of mineral resources—particularly diamonds. 
See Michael O’Flaherty, Sierra Leone’s Peace Process: The Role of the Human Rights Community, 26 
HUM. RTS. Q. 29, 33–35 (2004). 
 Serious doubts would remain with respect 
to domestic agents.  
 322. Levmore, supra note 66, at 1698–99. 
 323. Gray, Devilry, supra note 44, at 159–64. 
 324. See, e.g., In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).  
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IV. A LIMINAL ROLE FOR REPARATIONS IN TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY 
“Every human being is fated to be enmeshed in the power relations 
he lives by.” 
—Karl Jaspers325
“Reparations” commonly are defined as “payment[s] justified on 
backward-looking grounds of corrective justice, rather than forward-
looking grounds such as the deterrence of future wrongdoing.”
 
326 
Reparations are about remedying “long-ago crimes.”327 While 
straightforward enough, this definition is far too limiting in the transitional 
justice context.328 First, it is avowedly and exclusively retrospective.329 
Second, as is demonstrated by the expanded typology set forth above, the 
category of “reparations” is much broader than is implied by a narrow 
focus on compensation, whether construed historically or 
counterfactually.330 More problematic from a practical perspective is that 
this constrained view of reparations makes almost inevitable objections 
based on the common commitment that individuals can be held 
accountable only for their own conduct and not that of others.331 This 
ethical individualism has significant resonance in the common law, and is 
almost axiomatic in American criminal jurisprudence. Writing for the 
Court in Morissette v. United States,332
 
 
 325. JASPERS, supra note 
 for example, Justice Jackson noted 
that “an intense individualism” is at the heart of the “compound concept” 
of criminal liability, constituted by the “concurrence of an evil-meaning 
mind with an evil-doing hand” that “took deep and early root in American 
15, at 34. 
 326. Rodney C. Roberts, The Counterfactual Conception of Compensation, in GENOCIDE’S 
AFTERMATH 132 (Claudia Card & Armen T. Marsoobian eds., 2007) (limiting the “species of justice” 
to “distributive justice and rectificatory justice”); see also Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra 
note 6, at 691. 
 327. Brophy, supra note 54, at 131. 
 328. IFILL, supra note 64, at 126, 128–31; Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 272; Yamamoto 
et al., American Reparations, supra note 273, at 35–37. 
 329. Yamamoto et al., American Reparations, supra note 273, at 35–37. 
 330. Harris, supra note 79, at 1784. For a description of these two approaches to measuring harm 
and compensation see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 57 (1974); Joel Feinberg, 
Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, in FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT 7 (1992); 
Roberts, supra note 326, at 133–34; see also Brophy, supra note 54, at 133 (noting that reparations 
claims often rely on counterfactual measures). 
 331. Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 703; see also Lee Harris, “Reparations” 
as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery Reparations, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 409, 414–20 (2003). 
 332. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
1094 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:1043 
 
 
 
 
soil.”333 For the purpose of assigning criminal liability, the constraints 
entailed by faith to ethical individualism are hard to contest. Indeed, I have 
argued elsewhere that for most perpetrators and participants in 
pretransitional abuses, criminal punishment cannot be imposed consistent 
with faith to ethical individualism in the form of the legality principle.334 
However, it is not at all clear that concern with ethical individualism is 
relevant in reparations debates. To the contrary, the fact that reparations 
proposals in the transitional justice context frequently confront seemingly 
intractable objections based on ethical individualism is evidence of a 
conceptual mistake in the form of a readiness to treat transitional justice as 
a case of ordinary justice.335
In addition to cash compensation, the reparations literature recognizes a 
broad diversity of material reparations and more “symbolic” measures, 
including apologies (whether private, public, or official), days of 
remembrance, and monuments.
 A more careful accounting of the unique 
practical and normative conditions that define pretransitional abuses and 
transitions to democracy holds significant hope for resolving frequent 
objections to reparations as elements of a broader hybrid approach to 
transitional justice, including limited criminal prosecutions and truth 
commissions. 
336 One might regard these sorts of efforts 
as “compensatory” in a broad sense. However they are much more than 
that. In particular, they reflect a significant but little understood fact about 
transitions: while even stable states constantly undergo change, transitions 
present a uniquely liminal moment for societies “betwixt and between”337
 
 
 333. Id. at 251–52 (1952). 
 
an abusive past and a future peace guarded and preserved by commitments 
to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Recognizing the liminal 
status of transitions provides valuable context for understanding the role of 
reparations in transitions to democracy. In particular, it focuses attention 
on the need in transition to assume the posture of Janus, facing 
simultaneously the past and the future in order to recognize and by 
affirmative steps correct, reform, and reshape the underlying causes of 
pretransitional abuses. This duty to achieve justice for the future in light of 
the past keeps faith with core transitional commitments to democracy, 
 334. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 1636–48. 
 335. See, e.g., Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Theoretical Underpinnings for Reparations: A 
Constitutional Tort Perspective, 22 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 3, 3 (2003); Posner & Vermeule, 
Ordinary Justice, supra note 176; Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6. 
 336. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 725–36; Rubio-Marín & De Greiff supra note 54, at 
330–32; Verdeja supra note 71, at 171–78. 
 337. TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 1. 
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human rights, and the rule of law. Recognizing and enforcing such a duty 
does not entail blame and therefore renders moot excuses based on ethical 
individualism while avoiding the mistakes, pitfalls, and insufficiencies of 
atonement, reconciliation, and other commonly discussed theories of 
transitional justice. 
A. Radical Evil338
I have argued elsewhere that prominent contributors to the transitional 
justice literature misunderstand the nature of challenges in transition and 
therefore miss significant theoretical and practical opportunities because 
they view transitional justice as “ordinary justice.”
 and Extraordinary Justice 
339 In particular, they 
fail to take normative account of both the “justice gap”340 (the radical 
disparity between justice needs and resources available to transitional 
regimes seeking some form of justice) and the underlying cause of that 
gap (the complex of cultural norms, social practices, institutional regimes, 
black letter law, official policies, institutional practices, social norms, 
cultural ideology, and historical teleology) that together provide the 
organizing ontology and justificatory ethic of abusive regimes and which 
ratify, induce, and sustain programs of mass violence.341 In those earlier 
works, I argued that taking account of the unique features of 
pretransitional atrocities, abusive regimes, and the transitions that follow 
provides considerable assistance in understanding the justice gap and in 
providing a framework for justifying and organizing programs of selective 
prosecution342 and posttransitional financial recovery.343
 
 
 338. I allude to NINO, supra note 
 By contrast, 
ignoring these features and treating transitional justice as ordinary justice 
(1) dooms transitions to accept the best justice possible; (2) inspires deep 
suspicion in public institutions that appear to have only a limited or ad hoc 
commitment to justice; (3) preserves a sense that those not prosecuted got 
away with it, thereby opening the door to self-help solutions that threaten 
109. 
 339. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2622, 2639–42; David C. Gray, What’s So Special 
About Transitional Justice? Prolegomenon for an Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional Justice, 
100 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 147, 148 (2006). Contra Posner & Vermeule, Ordinary Justice, supra 
note 176. 
 340. Christine Bell & Catherine O’Rourke, Does Feminism Need a Theory of Transitional Justice, 
1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 23, 35 (2007); Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2624–29. 
 341. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 16, at 2629–36. 
 342. Id. at 2636–49. 
 343. Gray, Devilry, supra note 44, at 157–64. 
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peace and stability; and (4) fails to provide a sensible model for justice 
institutions established by a new regime.344
That same short-sightedness is manifest in reparations debates. Here, 
the mistake is to treat reparations as gap-filling measures, meant to 
provide partial vindication for retributive impulses
  
345 or restitution claims 
residual of the ordinary justice familiar in stable states.346 This ordinary-
justice approach views reparations through a retrospective legal lens, 
analogizing them to tort and quasi-tort remedies347 that “provide payment 
(in cash or in kind) . . . on the basis of wrongs . . . [for] which the payment 
is justified on backward-looking grounds of corrective justice . . . .”348
Indulging this retrospective bias marks a serious mistake for 
reparations advocates. Reparations, like criminal prosecution programs, 
certainly must take account of the past. There is no doubt that reparations 
programs are driven by past atrocities. However, as part of broader 
transitional justice programs, reparations must cast an eye to the future as 
part of a broader effort to sow the ground for future peace and stability. In 
the transitional context, taking account of the past means much more than 
documenting wrongdoing and measuring harm. Likewise, achieving 
justice for the future means much more than shaking hands and moving 
on. Justice in transition means recognizing past wrongs as oppositional 
markers for future conduct and policy. Taking seriously this goal of 
pursuing the future with a view toward the past requires as a first step 
understanding the sources and causes of atrocities. 
 
Even more creative proponents of alternative models, such as atonement, 
maintain a retrospective focus. They just cast reparations in personal terms 
by demanding apology and forgiveness.  
Anthropologist Victor Turner defines social paradigms as “sets of 
‘rules’ from which many kinds of sequences of social action may be 
generated but which further specify what sequences must be excluded.”349 
Paradigms draw and maintain social boundaries and designate roles and 
positions for individuals within society.350
 
 
 344. Gray, Excuse-Centered, supra note 
 As the rules governing 
16, at 2622. 
 345. Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 284–87; Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 
6, at 691. 
 346. Jordan, supra note 94, at 25; Shelton, supra note 94, at 844. 
 347. Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 284–87. 
 348. Posner & Vermeule, Reparations, supra note 6, at 691. 
 349. VICTOR TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS, AND METAPHORS 17 (1974) [hereinafter TURNER, 
DRAMAS]. 
 350. MARC J. SWARTZ, VICTOR TURNER, & ARTHUR TUDEN, POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 31 
(1966).  
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acceptable conduct and social identities, paradigms are both the subject 
and the object of social action. That is, paradigms generate their own 
subjects, but also compete with other paradigms.351 As described by 
Turner, paradigms bear a close resemblance to what Michel Foucault 
describes as “regimes of truth”: the circular relationships between “Truth,” 
conceived as “systems of ordered procedures for the production, 
regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements,” “systems 
of power which produce and sustain [Truth],” and “effects of power which 
[Truth] induces and which extend [Truth].”352 In abusive regimes the 
dominant social paradigm demands, or at least tolerates, targeted abuse 
against an identified group.353 These abusive paradigms, though as varied 
as the capacity for creative evil resident in our species,354 share a few 
salient features. First, they tend to reduce society to a single dyadic 
opposition with all subjects assigned to one side of a definitive line.355 
Second, following this “bi-polar logic,”356 an abusive paradigm 
characterizes those in one group as subhuman and naturally subservient,357 
or at least not people “like us,”358 deserving of treatment as equals. Third, 
those targeted for abuse are regarded as a persistent and emergent threat 
against the survival of the dominant group and its ability to achieve its 
rightful place at the end of history.359
 
 
 351. TURNER, DRAMAS, supra note 
  
349, at 17. 
 352. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth and Power, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 109, 133 (1980). Foucault’s 
less esoteric histories document the life in society of various regimes of truth. See, e.g., MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1995) (criminology); MICHEL 
FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON (1988) 
(psychology). 
 353. See MARK DANNER, THE MASSACRE AT EL MOZOTE (1993); GOLDHAGEN, supra note 233, 
at 27–163, 416–54 (1996); GOUREVITCH, supra note 233, at 47–62, 96–131; INDEPENDENT INT’L 
COMM’N ON KOSOVO, KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 
33–64 (2000); SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 
(2002); Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding 
Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 59 (2002); Malamud-Goti, supra note 109, at 29–99; 
Nino, supra note 109, at 41–60; Rorty, supra note 232, at 112–15. 
 354. See Brooks, The Age of Apology, supra note 71, at 4 (“[A]ll societies have the capacity to do 
evil. No society holds a monopoly on the commission of human injustices, nor is any society 
exempted. To Max Frankel’s question—‘Is there a beast in each of us waiting to be unleashed by 
extraordinary fear, greed or fury?’—I would have to answer, yes.”). 
 355. Malamud-Goti, supra note 109, at 29–99; see also ELSTER, supra note 19, at 93. 
 356. Malamud-Goti, supra note 109, at 83–89. 
 357. Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 267; Rorty, supra note 232, at 112–15. 
 358. Fortson, supra note 91, at 77 (“Whiteness is based principally on the oppression of minority 
groups by defining them as Other.”) (citing Harris, supra note 79, at 1737). 
 359. GOLDHAGEN, supra note 233, at 3–24, 49–50; SIMON WIESENTHAL, THE SUNFLOWER: ON 
THE POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF FORGIVENESS 15 (1997); see also Swartz, Turner, & Tuden, supra 
note 350, at 15 (attaching conformance to consensual power and to the preservation of a desired social 
order). 
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The role of an abusive paradigm at the core of pretransitional abuses is 
widely recognized in the transitional justice literature.360 Roy Brooks, for 
example, has noted that “atrocities can only occur when the perpetrator 
fails to identify with [his] victims and fails to recognize a common 
humanity between [himself] and the victims.”361 Richard Rorty echoed 
this view in an essay on the Balkans, noting that those who participate in 
mass atrocities do not regard their victims as “fellow human beings,” but 
as mere “animals” or, at best, “pseudohumans.”362 In a variation on the 
theme, Daniel Goldhagen has argued that, like the German perpetrators of 
the Holocaust, “the Argentine [and] Chilean murderers of people who 
opposed the recent authoritarian regimes thought that their victims should 
die” and that “Tutsis who slaughtered Hutus in Burundi [and] Hutus who 
slaughtered Tutsis in Rwanda . . . [and] Serbs who have killed Croats or 
Bosnian Muslims, did so out of conviction in the justice of their 
actions.”363 Philip Gourevitch has seconded Goldhagen’s assessment of 
the Rwandan genocide, adding that genocide is “an exercise in community 
building” for abusers.364 W.E.B. Du Bois linked racial oppression to, inter 
alia, German abuse of Jews, noting the centrality of intergroup fear at the 
heart of violence.365 In her careful history of twentieth-century lynching on 
the eastern shore of Maryland, Sherrilyn Ifill documents “the role of 
ordinary members of the community in supporting or condoning [lynching 
as an] act of racial terrorism,” linking that support to a background racism 
that cast blacks as dangerous, prone to violence, and lesser evolved.366
While assault, rape, and murder are relatively infrequent and broadly 
condemned in stable states, the paradigm that holds sway in pretransitional 
regimes provides a view of the world for abusers in which that same 
conduct targeted against members of a specific group
 
367
 
 
 360. See PHILLIP G. ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE 
TURN EVIL 296 (2007); Roberta Senechal de la Roche, Collective Violence as Social Control, 11 SOC. 
FORUM 97, 106 (1996); Roberta Senechal de la Roche, The Sociogenesis of Lynching, in UNDER 
SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE SOUTH 48 (W. Fitzhugh Brundage ed., 1997). 
 is at least not 
 361. Brooks, Reparations, supra note 6, at 267. 
 362. Rorty, supra note 232, at 112. 
 363. GOLDHAGEN, supra note 233, at 14–15. 
 364. GOUREVITCH, supra note 233, at 95. 
 365. W.E.B. Du Bois, The Shape of Fear, reprinted in THE SOCIAL THEORY OF W.E.B. DU BOIS 
56 (Phil Zuckerman ed., 2004). 
 366. IFILL, supra note 64, at 17, 43–44, 64–66. 
 367. Brooks, supra note 6, at 3–11; Rorty, supra note 232, at 112 (Rorty writes about 
dehumanization of targets for violence in the Balkans, noting that “they are not doing these things to 
fellow human beings, but to Muslims” who are regarded as “pseudohumans.” He then connects that 
ontologically grounded targeting to Jefferson’s ability to both own slaves and to “think it self-evident 
that all men were endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights.”). 
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prohibited, and more often is a moral or historical imperative. That public 
sanction often manifests subjectively as a sense of entitlement on the part 
of abusers.368 They are “willing executioners”369 because they are 
defending their view of the world and carrying out their destiny as a 
people, group, or society.370 That individual willingness, cast widely, is the 
animating core of abusive regimes and provides a descriptive explanation 
for the large numbers and broad array of individuals implicated in acts of 
violence.371
Some form of abusive paradigm is at the heart of all mass violence. In 
some cases abusive paradigms are motivators, in other cases simple 
catalysts. In all cases, however, some socio-normative grounding is a sine 
qua non for pretransitional violence.
  
372
B. Repairing Paradigms of Abuse 
 To argue the contrary is to claim 
that mass violence is mere happenstance, a coincidence of uncoordinated 
and independent action by thousands or tens of thousands of unconnected 
agents. That view is simply not tenable and bears no descriptive weight. It 
is the role played by an abusive paradigm that distinguishes pretransitional 
violence from the common street violence more familiar in stable states.  
This Article contends that most of the reparations literature evidences 
one or both of two conceptual biases. First, most reparations proposals 
follow a tort model familiar from ordinary justice which focuses on 
compensating harm. Second, most reparations proposals evidence a 
temporal bias. Most are exclusively retrospective, but some, including 
atonement, evidence a prospective bias. By succumbing to one or both of 
these theoretical mistakes, most reparations proposals open the door to 
objections based on ethical individualism. Those objections only appear to 
have merit if the discussion of reparations is limited to backward-facing 
justifications. As is suggested here, transitional justice is by definition 
Janus-faced. It begs the question to define any particular policy of 
transitional justice as exclusively retrospective or exclusively prospective. 
More troubling, however, is the fact that these biases lead advocates to 
misunderstand the fundamental challenge in transitions to democracy and 
 
 
 368. See, e.g., GOLDHAGEN, supra note 233, at 14–15.  
 369. GOLDHAGEN, supra note 233. 
 370. See supra notes 358–66. 
 371. JASPERS, supra note 15, at 34–35. 
 372. See Rorty, supra note 232, at 112–16. 
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therefore to miss the strongest normative case for reparations as part of a 
broader effort to achieve justice in transition.  
Transitions and, therefore, transitional justice programs, live in an 
explicitly liminal373 space between the downfall of the abusive regime and 
the reintegration of members, victims, and abusers alike into a fully 
reconstituted successor regime. In this land “betwixt and between,”374 
transitional justice can only be understood as processes of symbolic, 
material, and substantive transformation, defined by the project of 
recognizing victims, achieving an acceptable level of parity among victims 
and abusers, instantiating necessary reforms of public institutions, and 
reforming official and public practices. Putting the question this way 
makes the solution to the reparations conundrum described in this Article 
relatively straightforward. Answering the call of “Nunca Mas”375
Taking the transitional justice project seriously reveals a significant 
distinction between reparations as part of a liminal process and tort awards 
or other compensatory measures. Even the most apparently compensatory 
reparations that might, in the stable state context, accomplish nothing 
more than restoration of the status quo ante, retain both a forward- and 
backward-looking face in the transitional justice context.
 requires 
situating reparations and other elements of a transitional justice program in 
the broader liminal process of transition.  
376 That is 
because reparations, as part of the process of transition, are always cast 
against the backdrop of an abusive society and its attendant paradigms. 
Reparations, therefore, are illuminated by the past. At the same time, as 
part of a project designed to achieve sustainable peace, justice, security, 
and the rule of law in and post transition, reparations also cast an image on 
the future. As a utopian project, transitional reparations must be justified 
by the goal of achieving reconstruction and reform. In particular, 
reparations must reflect the primary goal of achieving new social and 
material conditions377
 
 
 373. I adopt the term “liminal” from the anthropological literature on rites of passage. See, e.g., 
TURNER, DRAMAS, supra note 
 for former victims and new relationships between 
349; TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 1; VICTOR TURNER, 
THE RITUAL PROCESS (1969); V. W. TURNER, SCHISM AND CONTINUITY IN AN AFRICAN SOCIETY: A 
STUDY OF NDEMBU VILLAGE LIFE (1957); ARNOLD VAN GENNEP, THE RITES OF PASSAGE (1960). 
 374. TURNER, FOREST OF SYMBOLS, supra note 1. 
 375. Nat’l Comm’n on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP), The Doctrine Behind the 
Repression, in NUNCA MÁS (NEVER AGAIN) pt. 5, available at http://www.desaparecidos.org/ 
nuncamas/web/english/library/nevagain/nevagain_281.htm. 
 376. Fortson, supra note 91, at 123. 
 377. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, 3 NEW LEFT REV. 107, 107–20 (2000); Hall, supra 
note 100, at 8. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss5/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010] A NO-EXCUSE APPROACH TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1101 
 
 
 
 
members of former abuser and victim groups.378
To borrow from John Rawls, transitional states are “burdened” 
societies.
 This last is a crucial 
measure of the transitional process. Transitions must achieve a sustainable 
new equilibrium among members of groups whose identities in the past 
marked the line between abuser and abused—lines that rendered abuse 
rational or necessary in relation to group identity and goals.  
379 Those burdens are many, but what Rawls highlights is the 
social and structural weight of an abusive paradigm.380 The highest 
imperatives in transition are (1) to elaborate that paradigm, and (2) to 
develop and deploy public policies. Those polices must be capable both of 
deconstructing the ontological and teleological commitments core to that 
abusive paradigm and of putting the abusive paradigm’s animating 
classificatory structure in a broader social context that evidences a healthy 
diversity of overlapping associations and oppositions.381 This proposal is a 
bit abstract. While full elaboration of the approach proposed here must 
wait for another day,382
The targeted violence characteristic of abusive regimes expresses a 
persistent social ontology and historical teleology that places individuals 
in a normalized hierarchical typology, identifying members of specified 
groups as subhuman and therefore rightful targets of abuse. That is, 
abusive regimes “institutionalize[] patterns of cultural value that 
pervasively deny some members the recognition they need in order to be 
full, participating partners in social interaction.”
 it is worth a moment in closing to suggest one 
application and how the approach commended here can respond to or 
avoid objections inspired by ethical individualism.  
383
First, reparations provide a formal and official recognition of past 
wrongs. However, the focus is not on measuring harm. Rather, the 
justification and goal is to situate victims in a developing social context 
 Treating reparations as 
liminal tools of transition reveals their potential to reconstruct both society 
and its constituents before reintegrating them into a posttransitional world.  
 
 
 378. Fraser, supra note 111; Nancy Fraser, Recognition Without Ethics?, 18 THEORY, CULTURE & 
SOC’Y 21–42 (2001). 
 379. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 5, 106 (1999).  
 380. Id. 
 381. Cf. MAX GLUCKMAN, CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA 17–26 (1956) (describing role of 
overlapping political identities in maintaining political stability); Kanchan Chandra, Ethnic Parties 
and Democratic Stability, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 235, 236, 242 (2005) (same). 
 382. See David Gray, Constitutional Faith and Dynamic Stability: Thoughts on Religion, 
Constitutions, and Transitions to Democracy, 69 MD. L. REV. 26 (2009) (describing the role of 
religion in achieving and maintaining dynamic stability in plural societies); David Gray, Extraordinary 
Justice (draft on file with author). 
 383. Fraser, supra note 111, at 49.  
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where they are identified as individuals capable of being wronged.384 
Recognizing harm, then, is an exercise in using the past as a point of 
contrast, illuminating, guiding, and regulating a present and future 
commitment to parity385
Second, the form of any reparation should be justified by and measured 
according to the goal of reshaping status arrangements among former 
victims and abusers.
 between those who populated the social 
categories of victim and abuser.  
386 A public apology by state officials is a good start. 
It recognizes past wrongs and the wrong thinking that led to abuses. 
However, public recognition, even if heartfelt, may not be sufficient to 
provide victims with the material conditions necessary to achieve, 
maintain, and exercise equal status.387 Again cast in the light of 
deprivations characteristic of systematic abuse, transitions frequently will 
need to provide some form of material reparation. The form will be highly 
context dependent.388 If the abusive paradigm that held sway in the past 
systematically denied those in the targeting group with fair and equal 
access to housing, for example, then reparations in the form of loan 
programs or building projects may be necessary to put victims on equal 
footing going forward.389 Similarly, if the abusive paradigm that 
dominated the past regime systematically denied those in the targeted 
group access to economic, social, and political opportunities that serve as 
gateways to full status, such as education, then reparations in the form of 
access guarantees, integration, preschool and tutoring programs, and 
targeted institutional development may be necessary to accelerate the 
arrival of former victims into circles of privilege and power.390
 
 
 384. Brandon Hamber & Richard A. Wilson, Symbolic Closure Through Memory, Reparation and 
Revenge in Post-Conflict Societies, 1 J. HUM. RTS. 1, 10 (2002). 
 However, 
neither in form nor scope can reparations be justified by an exclusively 
 385. Patricia Lundy & Mark McGovern, The Role of Community in Participatory Transitional 
Justice, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW 99, 107, 108–12 (Kieran McEvoy & Lorna 
McGregor eds., 2008). 
 386. Verdeja, supra note 71, at 167. 
 387. See Ellen Waldman, Restorative Justice and the Pre-Conditions for Grace: Taking Victim’s 
Needs Seriously, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 91, 93 (2007) (“Victims of serious crime and 
violation may need more tangible help . . . before they can be expected to dispense the spiritual balm 
and experience the psychological release that restorative theorists envision.”). 
 388. See Daly, supra note 70, at 77–78 (arguing that transitional periods are periods of social 
transformation away from past abuses such that the transitional approach must be highly particularized 
to the local context). 
 389. McCarthy, supra note 6, at 758–64. 
 390. Fraser, supra note 111, at 73; Erika R. George, After Atrocity Examples from Africa: The 
Right to Education and the Role of Law in Restoration, Recovery, and Accountability, 5 LOY. INT’L L. 
REV. 59, 78–85 (2008). 
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retrospective focus on compensating for past harms. Rather, out of respect 
for the liminal status of transitions and the unique goals of transitional 
justice, reparations programs must specify the source and form of past 
wrongs, identify constraints on individual and broader social justice, and 
tailor reparations strategies that enhance the ability of former victims to 
participate as equals in society, culture, politics, and the economy.391
V. CONCLUSION 
 
While further elaboration of the approach to reparations as part of a 
broader transitional justice program must wait for another day, its potential 
to avoid or moot common objections motivated by ethical individualism is 
apparent. The goal in transition is not to return from a high-point of mass 
atrocity to a baseline of persistent injustice—the view that is implied by 
tort models and counterfactual measures of harm.392
 
 
 391. Kristen McConnachie & John Morison, Constitution-Making, Transition and the 
Reconstitution of Society, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FROM BELOW 75, 88–96 (Kieran McEvoy & 
Lorna McGregor eds., 2008). 
 Rather, the animating 
justification for transitional justice is to open a society up entirely, to 
examine and correct the causes of abuse, and to exploit positively the 
liminal period of transition to achieve the cognitive and structural changes 
that will ensure peace, justice, and stability going forward. This is an 
obligation to justice that inheres to every transitional society and to each 
of its members in the wake of institutionalized human rights abuses. 
Objections to reparation such as “It wasn’t me” that reflect a background 
commitment to ethical individualism are therefore non sequiturs. For heirs 
to an abusive paradigm, there simply is no excuse for refusing to make it 
right. 
 392. See De Greiff, supra note 30, at 457; Rubio-Marín & De Greiff, supra note 54, at 325. 
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